Fuzzing is often described as a “black box” software testing technique. It works by automatically feeding a program multiple input iterations in an attempt to trigger an internal error indicative of a bug, and potentially crash it. Such program errors and crashes are indicative of the existence of a security vulnerability, which can later be researched and fixed.
Fuzz testing is now making a transition from a hacker-grown tool to a commercial-grade product. There are many different types of applications that can be fuzzed, many different ways they can be fuzzed, and a variety of different problems that can be uncovered. There are also problems that arise during fuzzing; when is enough enough? These issues and many others are fully explored.
. Learn How Fuzzing Finds Vulnerabilities
Eliminate buffer overflows, format strings and other potential flaws
. Find Coverage of Available Fuzzing Tools
Complete coverage of open source and commercial tools and their uses
. Build Your Own Fuzzer
Automate the process of vulnerability research by building your own tools
. Understand How Fuzzing Works within the Development Process
Learn how fuzzing serves as a quality assurance tool for your own and third-party software
The Internet, as well as other telecommunication networks and information systems, have become an integrated part of our daily lives, and our dependency upon their underlying infrastructure is ever-increasing. Unfortunately, as our dependency has grown, so have hostile attacks on the cyber infrastructure by network predators. The lack of security as a core element in the initial design of these information systems has made common desktop software, infrastructure services, and information networks increasingly vulnerable to continuous and innovative breakers of security. Worms, viruses, and spam are examples of attacks that cost the global economy billions of dollars in lost productivity. Sophisticated distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks that use thousands of web robots (bots) on the Internet and telecommunications networks are on the rise. The ramifications of these attacks are clear: the potential for a devastating largescale network failure, service interruption, or the total unavailability of service. Yet many security programs are based solely on reactive measures, such as the patching of software or the detection of attacks that have already occurred, instead of proactive measures that prevent attacks in the first place. Most of the network security configurations are performed manually and require experts to monitor, tune security devices, and recover from attacks. On the other hand, attacks are getting more sophisticated and highly automated, which gives the attackers an advantage in this technology race. A key contribution of this book is that it provides an integrated view and a comprehensive framework of the various issues relating to cyber infrastructure protection. It covers not only strategy and policy issues, but it also covers social, legal, and technical aspects of cyber security as well. We strongly recommend this book for policymakers and researchers so that they may stay abreast of the latest research and develop a greater understanding of cyber security issues.
Terrorist groups are currently using information and communication technologies to orchestrate their conventional attacks. More recently, terrorists have been developing a new form of cyber-capability to coordinate cyber attacks. This book explores the possibility that cyber-terrorists may have developed or may have future capabilities to attack critical infrastructure by accessing Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems within Australia and throughout the world. The book characterises the Australian security and terrorism environment and discusses the vulnerability of Australian computer systems and control systems. It also discusses the cyber-capability of various terrorist groups, SCADA risk evaluation methods and presents a framework to measure and protect SCADA systems from the threat of cyber-terrorism within Australia. This framework forms the main basis of this research and is examined by three focus group interviews, signifying the need for new counter-terrorism security models to assist with assessing new cyber security threats such as cyber-terrorism. This contribution is of great value to the SCADA community and organisations.
Cybercrime is becoming more organised and established as a transnational business. High technology online skills are now available for rent to a variety of customers, possibly including nation states, or individuals and groups that could secretly represent terrorist groups. The increased use of automated attack tools by cybercriminals has overwhelmed some current methodologies used for tracking Internet cyberattacks, and vulnerabilities of the U.S. critical infrastructure, which are acknowledged openly in publications, could possibly attract cyberattacks to extort money, or damage the U.S. economy to affect national security. In April and May 2007, NATO and the United States sent computer security experts to Estonia to help that nation recover from cyberattacks directed against government computer systems, and to analyze the methods used and determine the source of the attacks. Some security experts suspect that political protestors may have rented the services of cybercriminals, possibly a large network of infected PCs, called a ‘botnet’, to help disrupt the computer systems of the Estonian government. DOD officials have also indicated that similar cyberattacks from individuals and countries targeting economic, political, and military organisations may increase in the future. Cybercriminals have reportedly made alliances with drug traffickers in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and elsewhere where profitable illegal activities are used to support terrorist groups. In addition, designs for cybercrime botnets are becoming more sophisticated, and future botnet architectures may be more resistant to computer security countermeasures. This book discusses options now open to nation states, extremists, or terrorist groups for obtaining malicious technical services from cybercriminals to meet political or military objectives, and describes the possible effects of a co-ordinated cyberattack against the U.S. critical infrastructure.
Despite their popularity and wider deployment, IEEE 802.11 WLANs have been found to be vulnerable to security threats soon after their emergence requiring adoption of security measures. However, the introduced security measures didn’t provide solutions for Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This book characterizes the DoS attacks based on their ease of applicability and the degree of severity they introduce, and evaluates countermeasures for efficiency and effectiveness in defending against the attacks. Among various DoS attacks, Authentication Request Flooding (AuthRF) and Association Request Flooding (AssRF), which are practical and needing lesser effort to cause damage, were selected for study using OMNET++ simulation environment embedding INET Framework. Designs and models have been developed for the selected attacks and for two versions of defenses: countermeasure and enhanced countermeasures. The studied attacks, AuthRF and AssRF, required less effort and caused severe damage. Both versions of defenses, Countermeasure and Enhanced countermeasure, are effective although they incur delay.