Chinese Cyber Nationalism offers the first comprehensive examination of the social and ideological movement that mixes Confucian cultural traditions and advanced media technology. Over the past decade, the Internet has increasingly become a communication center, organizational platform, and channel of execution by which Chinese nationalistic causes have been promoted throughout the world. Dr. Xu Wu chronicles the movement's evolutionary path through five distinct developing phases that cover the span of twelve years. Through the use of online surveys and in-depth interviews with foreign policy makers, nationalist webmasters, and leading intellectuals in China, this book analyzes the characteristics and political implications of the movement. Xu presents a unique framework for scholars to understand China's modernization and historic return onto the world stage. Chinese Cyber Nationalism is a important addition to the study of political communication and China's foreign policy.
Is the Internet erasing national borders? Will the future of the Net be set by Internet engineers, rogue programmers, the United Nations, or powerful countries? Who’s really in control of what’s happening on the Net?
In this provocative new book, Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu tell the fascinating story of the Internet’s challenge to governmental rule in the 1990s, and the ensuing battles with governments around the world. It’s a book about the fate of one idea–that the Internet might liberate us forever from government, borders, and even our physical selves. We learn of Google’s struggles with the French government and Yahoo’s capitulation to the Chinese regime; of how the European Union sets privacy standards on the Net for the entire world; and of eBay’s struggles with fraud and how it slowly learned to trust the FBI. In a decade of events the original vision is uprooted, as governments time and time again assert their power to direct the future of the Internet. The destiny of the Internet over the next decades, argue Goldsmith and Wu, will reflect the interests of powerful nations and the conflicts within and between them.
While acknowledging the many attractions of the earliest visions of the Internet, the authors describe the new order, and speaking to both its surprising virtues and unavoidable vices. Far from destroying the Internet, the experience of the last decade has lead to a quiet rediscovery of some of the oldest functions and justifications for territorial government. While territorial governments have unavoidable problems, it has proven hard to replace what legitimacy governments have, and harder yet to replace the system of rule of law that controls the unchecked evils of anarchy. While the Net will change some of the ways that territorial states govern, it will not diminish the oldest and most fundamental roles of government and challenges of governance.
Well written and filled with fascinating examples, including colorful portraits of many key players in Internet history, this is a work that is bound to stir heated debate in the cyberspace community.
From Publishers Weekly: Written by a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, this is a straightforward examination of the structure, operations and methodology of the intelligence services of the People's Republic of China. Eftimiades describes how the Ministry of State Security–China's preeminent civilian intelligence-gathering entity–draws on the services of diplomats, commercial representatives, Chinese communities in overseas cities and students. (The People's Republic sends approximately 40,000 students abroad annually.) His analysis of the case of Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a longtime CIA employee who was convicted of espionage in 1986, reveals much about Chinese operations in the United States. Although Eftimiades cautions that the Ministry of State Security will continue to penetrate and exploit the political, academic, industrial and technological institutions of Western nations, he adds reassuringly that China's intelligence apparatus is hobbled by its own red tape and hindered by the stultifying bureaucracy of the Chinese Communist Party. Of interest mainly to specialists.
The United States, our allies, and our partners face a spectrum of challenges, including violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers, emerging space and cyber threats, natural and pandemic disasters, and a growing competition for resources. The Department of Defense must respond to these challenges while anticipating and preparing for those of tomorrow. We must balance strategic risk across our responses, making the best use of the tools at hand within the U.S. Government and among our international partners. To succeed, we must harness and integrate all aspects of national power and work closely with a wide range of allies, friends and partners. We cannot prevail if we act alone.
As noted in the 2006 QDR, state actors no longer have a monopoly over the catastrophic use of violence. Small groups or individuals can harness chemical, biological, or even crude radiological or nuclear devices to cause extensive damage and harm. Similarly, they can attack vulnerable points in cyberspace and disrupt commerce and daily life in the United States, causing economic damage, compromising sensitive information and materials, and interrupting critical services such as power and information networks. National security and domestic resources may be at risk, and the Department must help respond to protect lives and national assets. The Department will continue to be both bulwark and active protector in these areas. Yet, in the long run the Department of Defense is neither the best source of resources and capabilities nor the appropriate authority to shoulder these tasks. The comparative advantage, and applicable authorities, for action reside elsewhere in the U.S. Government, at other levels of government, in the private sector, and with partner nations. DoD should expect and plan to play a key supporting role in an interagency effort to combat these threats, and to help develop new capacities and capabilities, while protecting its own vulnerabilities.
In the contemporary strategic environment, the challenge is one of deterring or dissuading a range of potential adversaries from taking a variety of actions against the U.S. and our allies and interests. These adversaries could be states or non-state actors; they could use nuclear, conventional, or unconventional weapons; and they could exploit terrorism, electronic, cyber and other forms of warfare. Economic interdependence and the growth of global communications further complicate the situation. Not only do they blur the types of threats, they also exacerbate sensitivity to the effects of attacks and in some cases make it more difficult to attribute or trace them. Finally, the number of potential adversaries, the breadth of their capabilities, and the need to design approaches to deterrence for each, create new challenges.
An underlying assumption in our understanding of the strategic environment is that the predominant near-term challenges to the United States will come from state and non-state actors using irregular and catastrophic capabilities. Although our advanced space and cyber-space assets give us unparalleled advantages on the traditional battlefield, they also entail vulnerabilities.
China is developing technologies to disrupt our traditional advantages. Examples include development of anti-satellite capabilities and cyber warfare. Other actors, particularly non-state actors, are developing asymmetric tactics, techniques, and procedures that seek to avoid situations where our advantages come into play.
The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a decade into a sweeping military modernisation program that has fundamentally transformed its ability to fight high tech wars. The Chinese military, using increasingly networked forces capable of communicating across service arms and among all echelons of command, is pushing beyond its traditional missions focused on Taiwan and toward a more regional defence posture. This book presents a comprehensive open source assessment of China‘s capability to conduct computer network operations (CNO) both during peacetime and periods of conflict, and will hopefully serve as a useful reference to policymakers, China specialists, and information operations professionals.