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This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This paper is about the Russian military's use of operational art to achieve its strategic objectives during the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008. In this brief war, the Russian military in a quick and decisive campaign overwhelmed Georgian forces to gain control of two breakaway republics, destroyed much of Georgia's armed forces on land and sea, and caused NATO to reconsider its offer of membership to Georgia. This study focuses on the Russian military's present conception of operational art, the relationship between operational art and strategy, and the ability of the Russian armed forces to apply it in a war, a matter of strategic importance to Russia. To accomplish this, this study examines the roots of Soviet thought and practice on operational art and points out the significant changes over time which have affected current thought and practice. The paper analyzes significant aspects of the campaign in Georgia that reflect not only Russia's rich tradition of operational art, but also reflect Western thinking and new Russian thinking. The study examines the future of Russian operational art based on recently announced military reforms and the implications of those reforms on Russian strategy.
For over a century, Russian and Soviet military thinkers have developed the operational art and have produced quality works on the subject. They have prepared for and practiced operational art in a series of wars under widely varying conditions over the last 80 years. These wars are rich in lessons of success and failure in operational art.1 The campaigns and major operations within these wars reveal both the Russian military's conception of operational art as well as their capacity to craft it to achieve strategic objectives at that time. The Russo-Georgian War of August 2008 is no exception. It reflects the current state of operational art within the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the reforms announced immediately following the war by the president and other senior leaders reflect the nation's and military's intentions to improve their capacity to effectively wage campaigns in the near future and present additional insights into some of Russia's strategic objectives.
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Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book discusses the realities of deterrence and retaliatory options to attacks in space and cyberspace.
Since the last years of the 20th Century, threats in space and cyberspace have become prominent, to the point where an attack can threaten state sovereignty and have regional, if not global consequences. These threats are emerging at the same time that the United States' reliance on its own space and cyber capabilities increases to maintain international diplomatic leadership and conventional military superiority. US national policy speaks to deterring and defending against such attacks, but a lack of international precedent and the legal limitations of war, specifically attribution, proportionality and discrimination, limit United States response options to an unprovoked attack in these domains. In order to establish an effective deterrence, the United States must move away from the Cold War model and fashion a global environment that fosters effective deterrent strategies. Building this new order requires the United States lead the international debate to define attacks in space and cyberspace and appropriate "self-defense" responses under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The United States must demonstrate the political will to take action unilaterally, if necessary, to set precedent, and erase the failures of past transgressions, including NATO's failure to respond to the Estonia cyber attacks in 2007. As deterrence is predicated on the ability to attribute in order to hold an adversary at risk, the United States must improve its ability to detect and attribute attacks in space and cyberspace. Finally, the United States must reduce its space and cyberspace vulnerabilities and prove to any potential adversary that its military can successfully fight through any degradation and win. Unless the United States takes prominent actions on these fronts and establishes an international recognized lexicon on space and cyberspace, any deterrent posture will likely fail and it will remain at risk to asymmetric attacks by adversaries emboldened by a veil of anonymity, who see the benefits of attacking the United States outweighing the risk of an unprovoked first strike.
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This important report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. As the Department of Defense executes its mission in its newest warfare domain, cyberspace, some have questioned its choices with regard to command and control of its cyber forces. This thesis examines historical cases of new warfare domains and how the Department of Defense structured the command and control elements of its forces dedicated to the air and space domains. It explores the current cyber command and control construct, and looks at two others that would likely be employed if a change in command and control were to occur. Those examined include a new functional combatant command focused on cyber, similar to U.S. Special Operations Command, and a stand-alone U.S. Cyber Force. This thesis considers the benefits and drawbacks of each, and seeks to serve as an informative tool should policymakers determine a new command and control model is necessary for cyber forces.
CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION * A. BACKGROUND * B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS * C. BENEFITS OF STUDY * D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS * E. METHODOLOGY * F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS * CHAPTER II – AIR DOMAIN * A. HISTORY * B. WHY AN AIR FORCE? * 1. The Nuclear Mission * 2. Airpower Strategy * C. RELATIONSHIP TO CYBER DOMAIN * D. SUMMARY * CHAPTER III – SPACE DOMAIN * A. HISTORY * B. WHY NOT A SPACE FORCE? * C. RELATIONSHIP TO CYBER DOMAIN * D. SUMMARY * CHAPTER IV – COMPETING CYBER COMMAND STRUCTURES * A. HISTORICAL APPLICATION TO CYBER DOMAIN * B. CURRENT STRUCTURE * 1. Benefits of Current Structure * 2. Drawbacks of Current Structure * C. MODIFIED JOINT STRUCTURE * 1. Benefits of a Modified Joint Structure * 2. Drawbacks of a Modified Joint Structure * 3. Application to the Cyber Domain * D. STAND-ALONE FORCE * 1. Benefits of a Stand-Alone Force * 2. Drawbacks of a Stand-Alone Force * E. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES * 1. Comparison of Modified Joint Structure to Current Structure * 2. Comparison of Stand-Alone Force Structure to Current Structure * F. SUMMARY * CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK * A. CONCLUSION * B. FUTURE WORK * LIST OF REFERENCES
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Public government statements have cited cyber-attacks by terrorists as a major concern for national security. To date, no large-scale cyber-terrorist attack has been observed, but terrorists are known to be using the Internet for various routine purposes. The discovery of Stuxnet in 2010 was a milestone in the arena of cybersecurity because, although a malware attack on industrial control systems was long believed to be theoretically possible, it was different to see malware used in reality to cause real physical damage. Stuxnet demonstrated that a sufficiently determined adversary with sufficient resources might be able to damage U.S. critical infrastructure physically through a cyber attack. Did Stuxnet change the threat of cyber-terrorism?
This monograph examines cyberterrorism before and after Stuxnet by addressing three questions: 1) Motive—Are terrorists interested in launching cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructures? 2) Means —Are terrorists building capabilities and skills for cyberattacks? and, 3) Opportunity—How vulnerable are U.S. critical infrastructures? Answers to these questions give a characterization of the post-Stuxnet cyberterrorism threat. The next question is why a major cyber-terrorist attack has not happened yet; this is explained from a cost-benefit perspective. Although cyberterrorism may not be an imminent threat, there are reasons to be concerned about the long-term threat and inevitability of cyberattacks. It is important to assess frequently the threat landscape and current government policies for enhancing the protection of national infrastructures.