Amazon Price: N/A (as of January 27, 2018 14:56 –
Public government statements have cited cyber-attacks by terrorists as a major concern for national security. To date, no large-scale cyber-terrorist attack has been observed, but terrorists are known to be using the Internet for various routine purposes. The discovery of Stuxnet in 2010 was a milestone in the arena of cybersecurity because, although a malware attack on industrial control systems was long believed to be theoretically possible, it was different to see malware used in reality to cause real physical damage. Stuxnet demonstrated that a sufficiently determined adversary with sufficient resources might be able to damage U.S. critical infrastructure physically through a cyber attack. Did Stuxnet change the threat of cyber-terrorism?
This monograph examines cyberterrorism before and after Stuxnet by addressing three questions: 1) Motive—Are terrorists interested in launching cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructures? 2) Means —Are terrorists building capabilities and skills for cyberattacks? and, 3) Opportunity—How vulnerable are U.S. critical infrastructures? Answers to these questions give a characterization of the post-Stuxnet cyberterrorism threat. The next question is why a major cyber-terrorist attack has not happened yet; this is explained from a cost-benefit perspective. Although cyberterrorism may not be an imminent threat, there are reasons to be concerned about the long-term threat and inevitability of cyberattacks. It is important to assess frequently the threat landscape and current government policies for enhancing the protection of national infrastructures.
Continue reading “Cyberterrorism After Stuxnet – Terrorist Cyberattacks, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), Motives, Critical U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities, al-Qaeda Computer Capability, PC Attacks”
Amazon Price: $9.99 $9.99 (as of April 20, 2018 13:10 –
This is a book about strategy and war fighting in the midst of a revolution in military affairs as the world moves into the twenty-first century. Its 11 essays examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state or NASTT (NBC-arming sponsor of terrorism and intervention) state; the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states; the revolutionary potential of information warfare; the lethal possibilities of biological warfare; and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA). The book's purpose is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies, and threats that will confront US national security decision makers in the twenty-first century. The participating authors are either professional military officers or civilian professionals who specialize in national security issues. Two of the architects of the US air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War have contributed essays that discuss the evolving utility of airpower to achieve decisive results and the lessons that might portend for the future of warfare. In "Principles of War on the Battlefield of the Future," which sets the tone for the book, Dr. Barry Schneider examines how traditional principles of war may have to be reassessed in light of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among third world states. Regarding the principle of "mass," traditional theory dictated that forces be massed for an offensive breakthrough. But Schneider argues that, against an enemy armed with WMD, dispersed of one's forces may, in fact, be more prudent, and fighting by means of "disengaged combat" prior to a decisive strike may be necessary. This requires high coordination and "superior targeting and damage assessment intelligence, combined with superior high-tech weapons." Still, the United States and its allies would not likely be able to dominate a future battlefield even with advanced conventional arms if they did not have close-in air bases to operate from and thereby to achieve air dominance over the battle space. Therefore, while it sounds good, striking from outside the enemy's range is not a real option for long if the enemy is mounting a ground campaign that is closing in on vital areas. Local air, sea, and ground power will be needed to contain the adversary forces and roll them back. This means local air bases and seaports must be available and protected. Contents * Introduction * 1 Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future * Barry R. Schneider * Overview: New Era Warfare? A Revolution In Military Affairs? * 2 New-Era Warfare * Gen Charles A. Horner, USAF, (Ret.) * 3 The Revolution in Military Affairs * Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill * Overview: Future Airpower and Strategy Issues * 4 Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century * Col John A. Warden III, USAF * 5 Parallel War and Hyperwar: Is Every Want a Weakness? * Col Richard Szafranski, USAF * Overview: Information Warfare Issues * 6 Information War – Cyberwar – Netwar * George Stein * 7 Information Warfare: Impacts and Concerns * Col James W. McLendon, USAF * Overview: Biological Warfare Issues * 8 The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction * Lt Col Terry N. Mayer, USAF * 9 Twenty-First Century Germ Warfare * Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF * 10 Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare * Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF * 11 On Twenty-First Century Warfare * Lawrence E. Grinter and Dr. Barry R. Schneider
Amazon Price: N/A (as of January 28, 2018 06:50 –
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This research paper develops the foundation for a new military operating concept to "fight the net" in support of 8th Air Force requirements and stand-up as the new Cyber Command. It applies the Air Force Concept Development framework to examine cyberspace as a newly designated warfare domain, and proposes cyber capabilities and effects that the Air Force should develop and apply as it seeks to execute its mission in cyberspace. Before the Air Force can effectively lead in the cyber domain, it must first fully characterize cyber conditions, threats, and vulnerabilities, and clearly define how and where it can contribute to the national cyberspace strategy. Once the Air Force accomplishes these tasks, it can then focus on the nature of war in the cyber domain and consider the implications for military doctrine and operations. In order to successfully build capability and capacity for operating in cyberspace, the Air Force needs to institutionalize "cyber-mindedness" to underpin organizational, research and development, and human capital investments that the Air Force needs "to fly and fight" effectively in cyberspace.
THE CYBER DILEMMA * Bounding the Cyberspace Domain * Requirement for a New Framework * Physical Attributes * Domain Differentiation: Cyber versus Information Operations in Cyberspace * Broad Implications for Joint Military Operating Concepts * Effects in Cyberspace * Implications for Command and Control, Network Operations, and ISR * A New Military Problem and New Solutions * Missions that Assure Operations in Cyberspace * Time Horizon, Assumptions, and Risks * Relevance and Concluding Thoughts * THE U.S. CYBER SITUATION – THE PERFECT STORM? * Current Conditions in the Cyber Domain * Information Infrastructure and Critical Infrastructure * Existing "Weather Fronts" – Cyber Threat Agents * Threat and Threat Agent Defined * Threat Agent Profiles * Strong Tropical Disturbance Feeding Energy to the Weather Fronts a.k.a. Cyber Vulnerabilities * Battling the Simultaneously Challenging Winds of Change * U.S. National Strategic Way Ahead * National Strategy * Government Report Card * The Air Force and the Cyber Domain * THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN OF WAR * Conduct of War in Cyberspace * The Classics * The American Way of War * Military Operational Design * The Role of Technology * Principles and Functions of War * OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE * Intrinsic Characteristics as a Unique Combat Domain * Broader Span of Effects * Surgical Precision * Stealthy/Low Probability of Detection * Non-attribution/Untraceable * Cyber Capabilities * Cyber ISR * Target System Identification and Profiling * Access and Installation of a Persistent Presence * Mapping of Enemy Systems and Data * Analyzing Adversary Capabilities * Determining Adversary Intentions * Attack/Retaliatory Strike Planning * Cyber Defense * Protection from Attack * Attack Detection and Attribution * Automated Attack Responses and Operator Alerts * Self-healing of Systems and Networks * Rapid Recovery after Attack * Cyber Attack * Cyber Attack Authorization * Disruption of Adversary C2 Systems, Processes, and Data * Denying Access to Adversary Systems and Data * Degrading Adversary System Performance * Destruction of Adversary Data, Computers, Networks * Cyberspace Effects * Cyber ISR * Cyber Defense * Cyber Attack * RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE WAY AHEAD * Methodology * Cyberspace and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate * Revolution in Military Affairs Defined * So What? * Cyberspace Operations as a Mission Capability Package * Critical Factors * Constituting a Cyber Warfare Corps * Training for Cyber Combat * Organizing Cyber Forces * Cyber Weapon Funding * CONCLUDING THOUGHTS * BIBLIOGRAPHY
Amazon Price: N/A (as of April 19, 2018 19:20 –
This important report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. As the Department of Defense executes its mission in its newest warfare domain, cyberspace, some have questioned its choices with regard to command and control of its cyber forces. This thesis examines historical cases of new warfare domains and how the Department of Defense structured the command and control elements of its forces dedicated to the air and space domains. It explores the current cyber command and control construct, and looks at two others that would likely be employed if a change in command and control were to occur. Those examined include a new functional combatant command focused on cyber, similar to U.S. Special Operations Command, and a stand-alone U.S. Cyber Force. This thesis considers the benefits and drawbacks of each, and seeks to serve as an informative tool should policymakers determine a new command and control model is necessary for cyber forces.
CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION * A. BACKGROUND * B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS * C. BENEFITS OF STUDY * D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS * E. METHODOLOGY * F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS * CHAPTER II – AIR DOMAIN * A. HISTORY * B. WHY AN AIR FORCE? * 1. The Nuclear Mission * 2. Airpower Strategy * C. RELATIONSHIP TO CYBER DOMAIN * D. SUMMARY * CHAPTER III – SPACE DOMAIN * A. HISTORY * B. WHY NOT A SPACE FORCE? * C. RELATIONSHIP TO CYBER DOMAIN * D. SUMMARY * CHAPTER IV – COMPETING CYBER COMMAND STRUCTURES * A. HISTORICAL APPLICATION TO CYBER DOMAIN * B. CURRENT STRUCTURE * 1. Benefits of Current Structure * 2. Drawbacks of Current Structure * C. MODIFIED JOINT STRUCTURE * 1. Benefits of a Modified Joint Structure * 2. Drawbacks of a Modified Joint Structure * 3. Application to the Cyber Domain * D. STAND-ALONE FORCE * 1. Benefits of a Stand-Alone Force * 2. Drawbacks of a Stand-Alone Force * E. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES * 1. Comparison of Modified Joint Structure to Current Structure * 2. Comparison of Stand-Alone Force Structure to Current Structure * F. SUMMARY * CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK * A. CONCLUSION * B. FUTURE WORK * LIST OF REFERENCES
Amazon Price: N/A (as of April 19, 2018 22:40 –
Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book discusses the realities of deterrence and retaliatory options to attacks in space and cyberspace.
Since the last years of the 20th Century, threats in space and cyberspace have become prominent, to the point where an attack can threaten state sovereignty and have regional, if not global consequences. These threats are emerging at the same time that the United States' reliance on its own space and cyber capabilities increases to maintain international diplomatic leadership and conventional military superiority. US national policy speaks to deterring and defending against such attacks, but a lack of international precedent and the legal limitations of war, specifically attribution, proportionality and discrimination, limit United States response options to an unprovoked attack in these domains. In order to establish an effective deterrence, the United States must move away from the Cold War model and fashion a global environment that fosters effective deterrent strategies. Building this new order requires the United States lead the international debate to define attacks in space and cyberspace and appropriate "self-defense" responses under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The United States must demonstrate the political will to take action unilaterally, if necessary, to set precedent, and erase the failures of past transgressions, including NATO's failure to respond to the Estonia cyber attacks in 2007. As deterrence is predicated on the ability to attribute in order to hold an adversary at risk, the United States must improve its ability to detect and attribute attacks in space and cyberspace. Finally, the United States must reduce its space and cyberspace vulnerabilities and prove to any potential adversary that its military can successfully fight through any degradation and win. Unless the United States takes prominent actions on these fronts and establishes an international recognized lexicon on space and cyberspace, any deterrent posture will likely fail and it will remain at risk to asymmetric attacks by adversaries emboldened by a veil of anonymity, who see the benefits of attacking the United States outweighing the risk of an unprovoked first strike.