This is a book about strategy and war fighting in the midst of a revolution in military affairs as the world moves into the twenty-first century. Its 11 essays examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state or NASTT (NBC-arming sponsor of terrorism and intervention) state; the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states; the revolutionary potential of information warfare; the lethal possibilities of biological warfare; and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA). The book's purpose is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies, and threats that will confront US national security decision makers in the twenty-first century. The participating authors are either professional military officers or civilian professionals who specialize in national security issues. Two of the architects of the US air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War have contributed essays that discuss the evolving utility of airpower to achieve decisive results and the lessons that might portend for the future of warfare. In "Principles of War on the Battlefield of the Future," which sets the tone for the book, Dr. Barry Schneider examines how traditional principles of war may have to be reassessed in light of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among third world states. Regarding the principle of "mass," traditional theory dictated that forces be massed for an offensive breakthrough. But Schneider argues that, against an enemy armed with WMD, dispersed of one's forces may, in fact, be more prudent, and fighting by means of "disengaged combat" prior to a decisive strike may be necessary. This requires high coordination and "superior targeting and damage assessment intelligence, combined with superior high-tech weapons." Still, the United States and its allies would not likely be able to dominate a future battlefield even with advanced conventional arms if they did not have close-in air bases to operate from and thereby to achieve air dominance over the battle space. Therefore, while it sounds good, striking from outside the enemy's range is not a real option for long if the enemy is mounting a ground campaign that is closing in on vital areas. Local air, sea, and ground power will be needed to contain the adversary forces and roll them back. This means local air bases and seaports must be available and protected. Contents * Introduction * 1 Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future * Barry R. Schneider * Overview: New Era Warfare? A Revolution In Military Affairs? * 2 New-Era Warfare * Gen Charles A. Horner, USAF, (Ret.) * 3 The Revolution in Military Affairs * Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill * Overview: Future Airpower and Strategy Issues * 4 Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century * Col John A. Warden III, USAF * 5 Parallel War and Hyperwar: Is Every Want a Weakness? * Col Richard Szafranski, USAF * Overview: Information Warfare Issues * 6 Information War – Cyberwar – Netwar * George Stein * 7 Information Warfare: Impacts and Concerns * Col James W. McLendon, USAF * Overview: Biological Warfare Issues * 8 The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction * Lt Col Terry N. Mayer, USAF * 9 Twenty-First Century Germ Warfare * Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF * 10 Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare * Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF * 11 On Twenty-First Century Warfare * Lawrence E. Grinter and Dr. Barry R. Schneider
Public government statements have cited cyber-attacks by terrorists as a major concern for national security. To date, no large-scale cyber-terrorist attack has been observed, but terrorists are known to be using the Internet for various routine purposes. The discovery of Stuxnet in 2010 was a milestone in the arena of cybersecurity because, although a malware attack on industrial control systems was long believed to be theoretically possible, it was different to see malware used in reality to cause real physical damage. Stuxnet demonstrated that a sufficiently determined adversary with sufficient resources might be able to damage U.S. critical infrastructure physically through a cyber attack. Did Stuxnet change the threat of cyber-terrorism?
This monograph examines cyberterrorism before and after Stuxnet by addressing three questions: 1) Motive—Are terrorists interested in launching cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructures? 2) Means —Are terrorists building capabilities and skills for cyberattacks? and, 3) Opportunity—How vulnerable are U.S. critical infrastructures? Answers to these questions give a characterization of the post-Stuxnet cyberterrorism threat. The next question is why a major cyber-terrorist attack has not happened yet; this is explained from a cost-benefit perspective. Although cyberterrorism may not be an imminent threat, there are reasons to be concerned about the long-term threat and inevitability of cyberattacks. It is important to assess frequently the threat landscape and current government policies for enhancing the protection of national infrastructures.
Continue reading “Cyberterrorism After Stuxnet – Terrorist Cyberattacks, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), Motives, Critical U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities, al-Qaeda Computer Capability, PC Attacks”
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. As the United States Air Force develops doctrine, education, and organization for cyberspace, we need to consider the traditional principles of war and how/if they apply to cyberspace, and under what situations, so we can develop a conceptual foundation for effective cyberspace warfighting doctrine. Most importantly, we should understand the cyberspace domain requires a new and different way of thinking to develop the most useful doctrine, education, and organizational structures. We must avoid falling into the trap of merely rewording existing air and space doctrine by simply replacing "air" or "space" with "cyber."
There are generally two predominant traditions for principles of war—the western view of Clausewitz and the eastern view of Sun Tzu. Clausewitz's western Newtonian world conceptualizes war using mass, objective, and maneuver among other principles in a state-on-state kinetic war for a political objective. However, Sun Tzu's eastern world conceptualizes war focusing on the criticality of intelligence, deception to defeat the mind of the enemy, and knowing that relationships between things matter most in the strategy of war. It is essential to examine which tradition is the best guide for developing cyber strategy; or do we need a combination?
Continue reading “Principles of War for Cyberspace – Cultures of Strategy in Cyberspace, Clausewitzian Cyberthink, Sun Tzu Cyberthink, Yin and Yang in Cyberspace, Doctrine and Education”
Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book discusses the realities of deterrence and retaliatory options to attacks in space and cyberspace.
Since the last years of the 20th Century, threats in space and cyberspace have become prominent, to the point where an attack can threaten state sovereignty and have regional, if not global consequences. These threats are emerging at the same time that the United States' reliance on its own space and cyber capabilities increases to maintain international diplomatic leadership and conventional military superiority. US national policy speaks to deterring and defending against such attacks, but a lack of international precedent and the legal limitations of war, specifically attribution, proportionality and discrimination, limit United States response options to an unprovoked attack in these domains. In order to establish an effective deterrence, the United States must move away from the Cold War model and fashion a global environment that fosters effective deterrent strategies. Building this new order requires the United States lead the international debate to define attacks in space and cyberspace and appropriate "self-defense" responses under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The United States must demonstrate the political will to take action unilaterally, if necessary, to set precedent, and erase the failures of past transgressions, including NATO's failure to respond to the Estonia cyber attacks in 2007. As deterrence is predicated on the ability to attribute in order to hold an adversary at risk, the United States must improve its ability to detect and attribute attacks in space and cyberspace. Finally, the United States must reduce its space and cyberspace vulnerabilities and prove to any potential adversary that its military can successfully fight through any degradation and win. Unless the United States takes prominent actions on these fronts and establishes an international recognized lexicon on space and cyberspace, any deterrent posture will likely fail and it will remain at risk to asymmetric attacks by adversaries emboldened by a veil of anonymity, who see the benefits of attacking the United States outweighing the risk of an unprovoked first strike.
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This paper is about the Russian military's use of operational art to achieve its strategic objectives during the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008. In this brief war, the Russian military in a quick and decisive campaign overwhelmed Georgian forces to gain control of two breakaway republics, destroyed much of Georgia's armed forces on land and sea, and caused NATO to reconsider its offer of membership to Georgia. This study focuses on the Russian military's present conception of operational art, the relationship between operational art and strategy, and the ability of the Russian armed forces to apply it in a war, a matter of strategic importance to Russia. To accomplish this, this study examines the roots of Soviet thought and practice on operational art and points out the significant changes over time which have affected current thought and practice. The paper analyzes significant aspects of the campaign in Georgia that reflect not only Russia's rich tradition of operational art, but also reflect Western thinking and new Russian thinking. The study examines the future of Russian operational art based on recently announced military reforms and the implications of those reforms on Russian strategy.
For over a century, Russian and Soviet military thinkers have developed the operational art and have produced quality works on the subject. They have prepared for and practiced operational art in a series of wars under widely varying conditions over the last 80 years. These wars are rich in lessons of success and failure in operational art.1 The campaigns and major operations within these wars reveal both the Russian military's conception of operational art as well as their capacity to craft it to achieve strategic objectives at that time. The Russo-Georgian War of August 2008 is no exception. It reflects the current state of operational art within the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the reforms announced immediately following the war by the president and other senior leaders reflect the nation's and military's intentions to improve their capacity to effectively wage campaigns in the near future and present additional insights into some of Russia's strategic objectives.