This latest revision of the Information Operations Primer provides an overview of Department of Defense (DoD) Information Operations (IO) doctrine and organizations at the joint and individual service levels. It is primarily intended to serve students and staff of the U.S. Army War College as a ready reference for IO information extracted and summarized from a variety of sources. Wherever possible, Internet websites have been given to provide access to additional and more up-to-date information. This booklet is intentionally UNCLASSIFIED so that the material can be easily referenced during course work, while engaged in exercises, and later in subsequent assignments. This booklet begins with an overview of Information Operations, Strategic Communication and Cyberspace Operations. At each level it describes strategies or doctrine, agencies, organizations, and educational institutions dedicated to the information element of national power. Finally, the document concludes with an IO specific glossary and hyperlinks to information operations, cyberspace operations and strategic communication related websites. CHAPTER I – CONCEPTS * Information Operations * Strategic Communication * Cyberspace and Cyberspace Operations * CHAPTER II – STRATEGIES, GUIDANCE & DOCTRINE * National Strategy and Guidance * U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace * National Framework for Strategic Communication * Department of Defense Strategy and Guidance * DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace * DoD Report on Strategic Communication * DoD Principles of Strategic Communication * Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3600.01 Information Operations * Joint Doctrine * Joint Information Operations Doctrine * Service Doctrine * Army Information Doctrine * Marine Corps Information Operations Doctrine * Navy Information Operations Doctrine * Air Force Information Operations Doctrine * CHAPTER III – ORGANIZATIONS * Department of State * Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs * The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications * National Agencies * National Security Agency (NSA) * Department of Defense * Under Secretary of Defense – Policy (USD(P)) * Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs – Communication Planning and Integration (CPI) * Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) * Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) * Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) * Joint Organizations and Educational Institutions * Joint Staff, Deputy Director for Global Operations (DDGO J39) * Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) * Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) * Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) * U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) * U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) * U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) * Joint Forces Staff College – Information Operations Program * Information Operations Center for Excellence Naval Postgraduate School * Service Organizations * Army Cyber Command/2nd Army * Army – 1st Information Operations Command (1st IO Cmd) * Army Reserve Information Operations Command (ARIOC) * United States Army Information Proponent Office (USAIPO) * Marine Corps Information Operations Center * Navy Information Operations Organizations * Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency * Headquarters 24th Air Force * 624th Operations Center * 67th Network Warfare Wing * 688th Information Operations Wing * 689th Combat Communications Wing * Glossary * Information Operations, Cyberspace, and Strategic Communication Related Websites
This anthology of cyber analogies will resonate with readers whose duties call for them to set strategies to protect the virtual domain and determine the policies that govern it. Our belief it that learning is most effective when concepts under consideration can be aligned with already-existing understanding or knowledge. Cyber issues are inherently tough to explain in layman's terms. The future is always open and undetermined, and the numbers of actors and the complexity of their relations are too great to give definitive guidance about future developments. In this report, historical analogies, carefully developed and properly applied, help indicate a direction for action by reducing complexity and making the future at least cognately manageable.
The Cyber Analogies Project was launched in 2012 to assist U.S. Cyber Command in identifying and developing relevant historical, economic, and other useful metaphors that could be used to enrich the discourse about cyber strategy, doctrine, and policy. The intent of the project is to provide useful insights, both for those with little technical background in or direct connection to cyberwar and cyber security and for those whose job it is to think about the spectrum of cyber-related issues every day. The project was conceived and carried out to help very senior, busy, responsible people understand topics and issues that are fast-moving and dynamic, and have potentially great consequences for society, security, and world affairs.
Continue reading “Cyber Analogies: Historical Parallels to Cyber Warfare, Cyber and Computer Security, Cyber Pearl Harbor Surprise Attack, Nuclear Scenarios, Internet and Web Attacks, Vulnerabilities”
This research paper analyzes the globalization trend and the effect it is having on the ability to conduct asymmetrical attacks against the United States and our Allies worldwide. This research is intended to provide insight into the way that globalization is allowing our potential adversaries to act on a global scale.
Globalization is having a tremendous effect on the ability of terrorist and criminal organizations to act on a global scale. These organizations are using asymmetrical means to target U.S. interests at home and abroad. The events of September 11th were the culminating effect of this trend that has played an increasingly greater role in the world in which we live. This research paper analyzes the globalization trend and the effect it is having on the ability to wage this new type of war. The negative effects of globalization have continued to create a large disenfranchised population primarily centered in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. This disenfranchised population has become the recruitment pool and their countries have become training bases for the networked terrorist and criminal who take advantage of the tools of globalization. Those tools include the internet that provides secure means of communication, the technology that enables them to act, and the porous environment that allows one to move around the world undetected. The U.S. needs to develop a better National Security Structure to deal with this threat and solve longstanding foreign policy issues. This security structure would take advantage of a network architecture that would be much more suited to managing information which is the primary weapon in the globally connected world. Policy changes would address issues that only fuel resentment and hatred towards the U.S. and make it easier for our adversaries to plan and conduct asymmetrical attacks.
Continue reading “Globalization and Asymmetrical Warfare – Information and Technology, Media Effects, Merging of Defense and Commercial Technologies, Nuclear and Cyber Attack Threats to America, Force Structure”
In 2005, the Department of Defense recognized cyberspace as the fifth operational domain. In 2009, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command directed the creation of U.S. Cyber Command on the heels of recently reported cyber attacks against Estonia and Georgia. These cyber attacks negatively affected the state's ability to provide effective governance. Sovereign nations across the world took notice. Cyber terrorism, at best cyber hacktivism, had crossed the threshold to embody what most consider acts of war. This strategic research paper utilizes the Estonia and Georgia cyber attacks to observe how cyber forces draw on the joint functions like a Brigade Combat Team or Air Expeditionary Wing uses the functions in their respective domains. The paper briefly describes cyber criminal activity, cyber hacktivism, and cyber terrorism to differentiate those activities from offensive cyber operations. The paper succinctly discusses U.S. Cyber Command's three mission areas, further defining the discipline of military offensive cyber operations. The paper then explores how Joint Force Commanders may utilize the joint warfighting functions depicted in Joint and Army doctrine to integrate and synchronize offensive cyber operations.
The cyber attacks on Estonia and Georgia negatively affected their ability to provide effective governance. Nations across the world took notice. Cyber terrorism, or at best cyber hacktivism, had crossed the threshold to embody what most sovereign nations consider acts of war. The Estonia and Georgia cyber attacks were not happenstance events, rather planned, integrated, and synchronized operations to achieve intended effects. The joint functions / warfighting functions provide an operational framework for Joint Force Commanders (JFC) to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize cyber operations. The ensuing analysis illustrates that cyber operations share many of the same qualities as the more traditional operations in the land, sea, air, and space domains. But, before any analysis can begin, we must review a few key actions the military has taken over the last ten years, define what constitutes cyberspace, and understand how cyber operations differs from cyber crimes, cyber hacktivism, and cyber terrorism.
Continue reading “Cyber Operations and the Warfighting Functions – USCYBERCOM, Cyber Attacks and Cyber War, Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS), SCADA, Russian and Georgian Conflict, Hacktivism”
The United States, our allies, and our partners face a spectrum of challenges, including violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers, emerging space and cyber threats, natural and pandemic disasters, and a growing competition for resources. The Department of Defense must respond to these challenges while anticipating and preparing for those of tomorrow. We must balance strategic risk across our responses, making the best use of the tools at hand within the U.S. Government and among our international partners. To succeed, we must harness and integrate all aspects of national power and work closely with a wide range of allies, friends and partners. We cannot prevail if we act alone.
As noted in the 2006 QDR, state actors no longer have a monopoly over the catastrophic use of violence. Small groups or individuals can harness chemical, biological, or even crude radiological or nuclear devices to cause extensive damage and harm. Similarly, they can attack vulnerable points in cyberspace and disrupt commerce and daily life in the United States, causing economic damage, compromising sensitive information and materials, and interrupting critical services such as power and information networks. National security and domestic resources may be at risk, and the Department must help respond to protect lives and national assets. The Department will continue to be both bulwark and active protector in these areas. Yet, in the long run the Department of Defense is neither the best source of resources and capabilities nor the appropriate authority to shoulder these tasks. The comparative advantage, and applicable authorities, for action reside elsewhere in the U.S. Government, at other levels of government, in the private sector, and with partner nations. DoD should expect and plan to play a key supporting role in an interagency effort to combat these threats, and to help develop new capacities and capabilities, while protecting its own vulnerabilities.
In the contemporary strategic environment, the challenge is one of deterring or dissuading a range of potential adversaries from taking a variety of actions against the U.S. and our allies and interests. These adversaries could be states or non-state actors; they could use nuclear, conventional, or unconventional weapons; and they could exploit terrorism, electronic, cyber and other forms of warfare. Economic interdependence and the growth of global communications further complicate the situation. Not only do they blur the types of threats, they also exacerbate sensitivity to the effects of attacks and in some cases make it more difficult to attribute or trace them. Finally, the number of potential adversaries, the breadth of their capabilities, and the need to design approaches to deterrence for each, create new challenges.
An underlying assumption in our understanding of the strategic environment is that the predominant near-term challenges to the United States will come from state and non-state actors using irregular and catastrophic capabilities. Although our advanced space and cyber-space assets give us unparalleled advantages on the traditional battlefield, they also entail vulnerabilities.
China is developing technologies to disrupt our traditional advantages. Examples include development of anti-satellite capabilities and cyber warfare. Other actors, particularly non-state actors, are developing asymmetric tactics, techniques, and procedures that seek to avoid situations where our advantages come into play.