The strategic and operational use of preemptive strikes transitioned from the traditional tactic of air raids to the use of covert cyber-attacks like Stuxnet designed specifically to disrupt enemy capabilities. Through a close examination of the evolution of preemptive strikes by the Israeli Defense Forces from the 1967 and 1973 wars to its airstrikes on neighboring nuclear production facilities in Iraq and Syria to its use of Stuxnet, operational planners can gain an understanding of the evolution of preemption as a concept. Examining this shift from air strikes to cyber-attacks through the lens of U.S. Army Doctrine and the tenets of Unified Land Operations (Depth, Synchronization, Integration, Adaptability, Flexibility, and Lethality) as well as the cyber concepts of Untraceability and Deception from modern thinkers gives operational planners a deeper understanding of how to conceptualize and integrate cyber activities into planning. By grasping these concepts and their usage in cyber, planners can gain a position of relative cognitive advantage when using preemptive attacks. Conceptualizing and interpreting the evolutionary process of Israeli operational planners and their understanding and planning of preemptive attacks can shed light on how they disaggregated depth and integrated cyber into preemption. Understanding how planners can better utilize cyber weapons similar to Stuxnet in preemptive strikes, contributes to the U.S. Army’s ability to retain its position of relative advantage over its adversaries in future wars.
Anticipating Surprise, originally written as a manual for training intelligence analysts during the Cold War, has been declassified and condensed to provide wider audiences with an inside look at intelligence gathering and analysis for strategic warning. Cynthia Grabo defines the essential steps in the warning process, examines distinctive ingredients of the analytic method of intelligence gathering, and discusses the guidelines for assessing the meaning of gathered information. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, intelligence collection and analysis has been hotly debated. In this book, Grabo suggests ways of improving warning assessments that better convey warnings to policymakers and military commanders who are responsible for taking appropriate action to avert disaster.
Cyber weapons and the possibility of cyber conflict ― including interference in foreign political campaigns, industrial sabotage, attacks on infrastructure, and combined military campaigns ― require policymakers, scholars, and citizens to rethink twenty-first-century warfare. Yet because cyber capabilities are so new and continually developing, there is little agreement about how they will be deployed, how effective they can be, and how they can be managed.
Written by leading scholars, the fourteen case studies in this volume will help policymakers, scholars, and students make sense of contemporary cyber conflict through historical analogies to past military-technological problems. The chapters are divided into three groups. The first ― What Are Cyber Weapons Like? ― examines the characteristics of cyber capabilities and how their use for intelligence gathering, signaling, and precision striking compares with earlier technologies for such missions. The second section ― What Might Cyber Wars Be Like? ― explores how lessons from several wars since the early nineteenth century, including the World Wars, could apply ― or not ― to cyber conflict in the twenty-first century. The final section ― What Is Preventing and/or Managing Cyber Conflict Like? ― offers lessons from past cases of managing threatening actors and technologies.
In 2011, the United States government declared a cyber attack as equal to an act of war, punishable with conventional military means. Cyber operations, cyber crime, and other forms of cyber activities directed by one state against another are now considered part of the normal relations range of combat and conflict, and the rising fear of cyber conflict has brought about a reorientation of military affairs. What is the reality of this threat? Is it actual or inflated, fear or fact-based?
Taking a bold stand against the mainstream wisdom, Valeriano and Maness argue that there is very little evidence that cyber war is, or is likely to become, a serious threat. Their claim is empirically grounded, involving a careful analysis of cyber incidents and disputes experienced by international states since 2001, and an examination of the processes leading to cyber conflict.
Continue reading “Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System”
This book is a multi-disciplinary analysis of cyber warfare, featuring contributions by leading experts from a mixture of academic and professional backgrounds.
Cyber warfare, meaning interstate cyber aggression, is an increasingly important emerging phenomenon in international relations, with state-orchestrated (or apparently state-orchestrated) computer network attacks occurring in Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008) and Iran (2010). This method of waging warfare – given its potential to, for example, make planes fall from the sky or cause nuclear power plants to melt down – has the capacity to be as devastating as any conventional means of conducting armed conflict. Every state in the world now has a cyber-defence programme and over 120 states also have a cyber-attack programme.
Continue reading “Cyber Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Analysis (Routledge Studies in Conflict, Security and Technology)”