Small unmanned aircraft are already transforming warfare, with hand-launched scouts like the Raven and lethal tactical drones like Switchblade already in use by US forces. A bigger revolution is on the way, as swarming software allows a single operator to control large numbers of drones, and smartphone technology means they can be built for $1,000 each — by anybody, not just governments. This book looks at the history of drone warfare, the rise of big drones like the Predator and how they are being eclipsed by smaller unmanned aircraft. And how the future is being shaped by smartphone technology, swarm software, miniaturised munitions and energy-harvesting that allows small drones to fly forever. It also looks at why current air defence cannot stop the swarms, and what drone swarms will mean for the balance of power and future wars. This is the world of Swarm Troopers
Carl Von Clausewitz described the purpose of war as "the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will." Unlike conventional military conflicts of the past, war in the information age is more a battle of wills than artillery, and doesn't necessarily end with decisive conclusions or clear winners. Cyber warfare between nations is conducted not only without the consent or participation of citizens but often without their knowledge, with little to see in the way of airstrikes and troop movements.
The weapons are information systems, intelligence, propaganda and the media. The combatants are governments, multinational corporations, hackers and whistleblowers. The battlefields are economies, command and control networks, election outcomes and the hearts and minds of populations. As with Russia's bloodless 2014 annexation of the Crimea, the cyberwar is fought before the infantry arrives. Written by a United States intelligence community insider, this book describes the covert aspects of modern wars and the agencies who fund and fight them.
Cyber security has become a focal point for conflicting domestic and international interests, and increasingly for the projection of state power. The military utility of the cyber domain is linked to the economic and social potential of information and communications technologies (ICTs), while technologies with military and national-security applications have become essential to the conduct of modern life.
In light of this, Evolution of the Cyber Domain provides a holistic review of the strategic, operational and technical issues at the centre of the international cyber-security debate. The Dossier charts and contextualises the key developments and trends that have shaped the cyber domain since the 1950s. As well as tracking the events and decisions underlying the military potential of ICTs, it examines the issues and policies that affect global governance of the internet.
Continue reading “Evolution of the Cyber Domain: The Implications for National and Global Security”
How does one engage in the study of strategy? Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower argues that strategy is not just concerned with amassing knowledge; it is also about recognizing our imperfect understanding of the environment and respecting the complex nature of adaptation to the unforeseen or unexpected. In essence, the strongest strategists are those who commit to an education that cultivates a more holistic and adaptive way of thinking. With that thought in mind, the contributors to Strategy, each a current or former professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, widely considered the Department of Defense’s premier school of strategy, offer ways of thinking strategically about a variety of subject matters, from classical history to cyber power.
Practitioners in the profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, must employ critical thinking where the application of power on land, at sea, in the air, and in space and cyberspace are concerned. Strategy examines various sub-disciplines regarding the use of power, and illuminates different approaches to thinking which have implications beyond the implementation of force.
This report highlights the results of a study of Network Centric Operations (NCO) as executed by V Corps and the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), (3 ID (M)), during the major offensive combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from March 2003 through April 2003. The U.S. V Corps was the senior U.S. Army tactical headquarters responsible for operations conducted primarily along and to the west of the Euphrates River, to include the seizure of Baghdad. At the onset of the campaign (crossing the Kuwait-Iraq border) 3 ID (M) was the only ground maneuver force available to V Corps and continued as the corps’ main effort through the seizure of Baghdad.