The purpose of this monograph is to examine whether the Principles of War, as defined within the U.S. military’s Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, can be applied to cyber war. Since 2005, the U.S. military recognized cyber conflict as a new domain for conducting military operations. Consequently, in order to ensure future success on the battlefield, commanders need to understand cyberspace operations and how these operations fit within the Principles of War. The methodology of this paper is to first examine, and subsequently show the history of the Principles of War in order to provide a context from which military personnel can then categorize cyberspace within the historic model. Such an examination is relevant because not only is U.S. cyber policy and strategy currently being developed, but the United States is also standing up a United States Cyber Command for the first time in history. Having discussed the Principles of War and woven them across an understanding of cyber operations, one can then see that the current Principles of War do in fact apply to cyber war. There is no need to create new Principles of War that apply exclusively to the cyber domain.
Carl Von Clausewitz described the purpose of war as "the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will." Unlike conventional military conflicts of the past, war in the information age is more a battle of wills than artillery, and doesn't necessarily end with decisive conclusions or clear winners. Cyber warfare between nations is conducted not only without the consent or participation of citizens but often without their knowledge, with little to see in the way of airstrikes and troop movements.
The weapons are information systems, intelligence, propaganda and the media. The combatants are governments, multinational corporations, hackers and whistleblowers. The battlefields are economies, command and control networks, election outcomes and the hearts and minds of populations. As with Russia's bloodless 2014 annexation of the Crimea, the cyberwar is fought before the infantry arrives. Written by a United States intelligence community insider, this book describes the covert aspects of modern wars and the agencies who fund and fight them.
The move on the part of the US military, which began in 1996, to Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), meant the combination of sensor grids, C&C grids, and precision targeting to increase speed to command, and represented a military offset. Along with networking comes exposure to cyber attacks, attacks that will be used in future wars.
This book provides an insightful introduction to the most important field of military innovation for the 21st century—robotic and drone weaponry.
• A chronology of important events in robotic technology
Continue reading “Military Robots and Drones: A Reference Handbook: A Reference Handbook (Contemporary World Issues)”
From Publishers Weekly: Written by a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, this is a straightforward examination of the structure, operations and methodology of the intelligence services of the People's Republic of China. Eftimiades describes how the Ministry of State Security–China's preeminent civilian intelligence-gathering entity–draws on the services of diplomats, commercial representatives, Chinese communities in overseas cities and students. (The People's Republic sends approximately 40,000 students abroad annually.) His analysis of the case of Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a longtime CIA employee who was convicted of espionage in 1986, reveals much about Chinese operations in the United States. Although Eftimiades cautions that the Ministry of State Security will continue to penetrate and exploit the political, academic, industrial and technological institutions of Western nations, he adds reassuringly that China's intelligence apparatus is hobbled by its own red tape and hindered by the stultifying bureaucracy of the Chinese Communist Party. Of interest mainly to specialists.