Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter Through Three World Wars

Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter Through Three World WarsOver the past decade, the United States has moved toward a new style of warfare, called network centric, that uses an almost real-time, shared picture of a military situation as the basis for operations. To explain what network-centric warfare is and how it works, defense analyst Norman Friedman uses specific historical examples of actual combat rather than the abstractions common to other books on the subject. He argues that navies invented this style of warfare and that twentieth-century wars, culminating in the Cold War, show how networked warfare worked and did not work and illustrate what net-on-net warfare means. The book builds on Friedman s personal experience in an early application of network-centric warfare that developed the method of targeting the Tomahawk anti-ship missile.To give readers a realistic feeling for what the new style of warfare offers and what is needed to make it work, the book concentrates on the tactical picture, not the communications network itself. Friedman s focus on what the warriors really want and need makes it possible to evaluate the various contributions to a network-centric system. Without such a focus, Friedman notes, the needs of networked warfare reduce simply to the desire for more and more information, delivered at greater and greater speeds. The information he provides is valuable to all the services, and students of history will appreciate the light it sheds on new ways of understanding old conflicts.

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The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare

The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber WarfareAll political and military conflicts now have a cyber dimension, the size and impact of which are difficult to predict. Internet-enabled propaganda, espionage and attacks on critical infrastructure can target decision makers, weapons systems and citizens in general, during times of peace or war. Traditional threats to national security now have a digital delivery mechanism which would increase the speed, diffusion and power of an attack. There have been no true cyber wars to date, but cyber battles of great consequence are easy to find. This book is divided into two sections – Strategic Viewpoints and Technical Challenges & Solutions – and highlights the growing connection between computer security and national security.

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Applying Lessons Learned from Interwar Airpower (1919-1939) to Joint Warfighting with Cyberpower

Amazon Price: $14.95 $14.95 (as of December 14, 2018 00:05 – Details). Product prices and availability are accurate as of the date/time indicated and are subject to change. Any price and availability information displayed on the Amazon site at the time of purchase will apply to the purchase of this product.

The United States has yet to use cyberwarfare in a major conflict, and the military services have differing ideas on what role cyberwarfare will play in America's next war. In addition, the services have unique and often contradictory perspectives on how they see the employment of cyberwarfare in military operations, and this conflict may affect combatant commanders' ability to employ cyberwarfare in their areas of responsibility. The United States military faced a similar problem after World War I when attempting to understand and exploit the nascent capabilities of airpower, which showed great potential but exited the Great War with an inconclusive service record. The Interwar Period saw rapid advancement in aviation, and the U.S. military struggled with questions of how to best organize, equip, and employ airpower after World War I's inconclusive results. The differing approaches of the United States Army and the United States Navy toward airpower evolution during the interwar period yield several lessons in the areas of doctrinal, personnel, and technological development that are applicable to the future employment of joint cyberpower in the post-Afgranistan War era. This book first explores how the culture and biases of the Army, Army Air Corps and Navy influenced the development of interwar theory and doctrine. It then examines airpower development through the lens of personnel, and uses the concepts of the change agent and the heterogeneous engineer to show how airpower development depended on the expertise and political acumen of senior officers who believed in airpower's potential and were determined to make it a reality. Finally, it looks at how the Army Air Corps and the Navy managed uncertainty about the nature of the nation's next war while in an environment marked by rapid technological progress in aviation.