From Publishers Weekly: Written by a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, this is a straightforward examination of the structure, operations and methodology of the intelligence services of the People's Republic of China. Eftimiades describes how the Ministry of State Security–China's preeminent civilian intelligence-gathering entity–draws on the services of diplomats, commercial representatives, Chinese communities in overseas cities and students. (The People's Republic sends approximately 40,000 students abroad annually.) His analysis of the case of Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a longtime CIA employee who was convicted of espionage in 1986, reveals much about Chinese operations in the United States. Although Eftimiades cautions that the Ministry of State Security will continue to penetrate and exploit the political, academic, industrial and technological institutions of Western nations, he adds reassuringly that China's intelligence apparatus is hobbled by its own red tape and hindered by the stultifying bureaucracy of the Chinese Communist Party. Of interest mainly to specialists.
How does one engage in the study of strategy? Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower argues that strategy is not just concerned with amassing knowledge; it is also about recognizing our imperfect understanding of the environment and respecting the complex nature of adaptation to the unforeseen or unexpected. In essence, the strongest strategists are those who commit to an education that cultivates a more holistic and adaptive way of thinking. With that thought in mind, the contributors to Strategy, each a current or former professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, widely considered the Department of Defense’s premier school of strategy, offer ways of thinking strategically about a variety of subject matters, from classical history to cyber power.
Practitioners in the profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, must employ critical thinking where the application of power on land, at sea, in the air, and in space and cyberspace are concerned. Strategy examines various sub-disciplines regarding the use of power, and illuminates different approaches to thinking which have implications beyond the implementation of force.
This book explains what network-centric warfare is, and how it works, using concrete historical naval examples rather than the usual abstractions. It argues that navies invented this style of warfare over the last century, led by the Royal Navy, and that the wars of that century, culminating in the Cold War, show how networked warfare worked – and did not work.These wars also illustrate what net-on-net warfare means; most exponents of the new style of war assume that the United States will enjoy a monopoly on it. This account is important to all the services; it is naval because navies were the first to use network-centric approaches (the book does take national air defense into account, because air defense systems deeply influenced naval development). This approach is probably the only way a reader can get a realistic feeling for what the new style of war offers, and also for what is needed to make it work. Thus the book concentrates on the tactical picture which the network is erected to help form and to disseminate, rather than, as is usual, the communications network itself.This approach makes it possible to evaluate different possible contributions to a network-centric system, because it focuses on what the warriors using the picture really want and need.Without such a focus, the needs of networked warfare reduce simply to the desire for more and more information, delivered at greater and greater speeds. Although it concentrates on naval examples, this book is of vital importance to all the services. It is the first book about network-centric warfare to deal in concrete examples, and the first to use actual history to illuminate current operational concepts.It also offers considerable new light on the major naval battles of the World Wars, hence ought to be of intense interest to historians. For example, it offers a new way of understanding the naval revolution wrought in the pre-1914 Royal Navy by Admiral Sir John Fisher.
This book is by far the bet ever published on the subject. The author makes extensive use of primary and secondary sources including active Chinese Intelligence officers, internal Chinese documents, and publications. His approach is clearly analytical with no unsupported opinions. Even ten years after publication this work is the only one of its kind. This work remains a "bible" in the Intelligence Community.
This book is written to be a comprehensive guide to cybersecurity and cyberwar policy and strategy, developed for a one- or two-semester class for students of public policy (including political science, law, business, etc.). Although written from a U.S. perspective, most of its contents are globally relevant.
It is written essentially in four sections. The first (chapters 1 – 5) describes how compromises of computers and networks permit unauthorized parties to extract information from such systems (cyber-espionage), and/or to force these systems to misbehave in ways that disrupt their operations or corrupt their workings. The section examines notable hacks of systems, fundamental challenges to cybersecurity (e.g., the lack of forced entry, the measure-countermeasure relationship) including the role of malware, and various broad approaches to cybersecurity.
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