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This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. As the United States Air Force develops doctrine, education, and organization for cyberspace, we need to consider the traditional principles of war and how/if they apply to cyberspace, and under what situations, so we can develop a conceptual foundation for effective cyberspace warfighting doctrine. Most importantly, we should understand the cyberspace domain requires a new and different way of thinking to develop the most useful doctrine, education, and organizational structures. We must avoid falling into the trap of merely rewording existing air and space doctrine by simply replacing "air" or "space" with "cyber."
There are generally two predominant traditions for principles of war—the western view of Clausewitz and the eastern view of Sun Tzu. Clausewitz's western Newtonian world conceptualizes war using mass, objective, and maneuver among other principles in a state-on-state kinetic war for a political objective. However, Sun Tzu's eastern world conceptualizes war focusing on the criticality of intelligence, deception to defeat the mind of the enemy, and knowing that relationships between things matter most in the strategy of war. It is essential to examine which tradition is the best guide for developing cyber strategy; or do we need a combination?
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This latest revision of the Information Operations Primer provides an overview of Department of Defense (DoD) Information Operations (IO) doctrine and organizations at the joint and individual service levels. It is primarily intended to serve students and staff of the U.S. Army War College as a ready reference for IO information extracted and summarized from a variety of sources. Wherever possible, Internet websites have been given to provide access to additional and more up-to-date information. This booklet is intentionally UNCLASSIFIED so that the material can be easily referenced during course work, while engaged in exercises, and later in subsequent assignments.
This booklet begins with an overview of Information Operations, Strategic Communication and Cyberspace Operations. At each level it describes strategies or doctrine, agencies, organizations, and educational institutions dedicated to the information element of national power. Finally, the document concludes with an IO specific glossary and hyperlinks to information operations, cyberspace operations and strategic communication related websites.
CHAPTER I – CONCEPTS * Information Operations * Strategic Communication * Cyberspace and Cyberspace Operations * CHAPTER II – STRATEGIES, GUIDANCE & DOCTRINE * National Strategy and Guidance * U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace * National Framework for Strategic Communication * Department of Defense Strategy and Guidance * DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace * DoD Report on Strategic Communication * DoD Principles of Strategic Communication * Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3600.01 Information Operations * Joint Doctrine * Joint Information Operations Doctrine * Service Doctrine * Army Information Doctrine * Marine Corps Information Operations Doctrine * Navy Information Operations Doctrine * Air Force Information Operations Doctrine * CHAPTER III – ORGANIZATIONS * Department of State * Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs * The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications * National Agencies * National Security Agency (NSA) * Department of Defense * Under Secretary of Defense – Policy (USD(P)) * Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs – Communication Planning and Integration (CPI) * Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) * Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) * Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) * Joint Organizations and Educational Institutions * Joint Staff, Deputy Director for Global Operations (DDGO J39) * Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) * Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) * Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) * U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) * U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) * U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) * Joint Forces Staff College – Information Operations Program * Information Operations Center for Excellence Naval Postgraduate School * Service Organizations * Army Cyber Command/2nd Army * Army – 1st Information Operations Command (1st IO Cmd) * Army Reserve Information Operations Command (ARIOC) * United States Army Information Proponent Office (USAIPO) * Marine Corps Information Operations Center * Navy Information Operations Organizations * Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency * Headquarters 24th Air Force * 624th Operations Center * 67th Network Warfare Wing * 688th Information Operations Wing * 689th Combat Communications Wing * Glossary * Information Operations, Cyberspace, and Strategic Communication Related Websites
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This important report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. As the Department of Defense executes its mission in its newest warfare domain, cyberspace, some have questioned its choices with regard to command and control of its cyber forces. This thesis examines historical cases of new warfare domains and how the Department of Defense structured the command and control elements of its forces dedicated to the air and space domains. It explores the current cyber command and control construct, and looks at two others that would likely be employed if a change in command and control were to occur. Those examined include a new functional combatant command focused on cyber, similar to U.S. Special Operations Command, and a stand-alone U.S. Cyber Force. This thesis considers the benefits and drawbacks of each, and seeks to serve as an informative tool should policymakers determine a new command and control model is necessary for cyber forces.
CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION * A. BACKGROUND * B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS * C. BENEFITS OF STUDY * D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS * E. METHODOLOGY * F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS * CHAPTER II – AIR DOMAIN * A. HISTORY * B. WHY AN AIR FORCE? * 1. The Nuclear Mission * 2. Airpower Strategy * C. RELATIONSHIP TO CYBER DOMAIN * D. SUMMARY * CHAPTER III – SPACE DOMAIN * A. HISTORY * B. WHY NOT A SPACE FORCE? * C. RELATIONSHIP TO CYBER DOMAIN * D. SUMMARY * CHAPTER IV – COMPETING CYBER COMMAND STRUCTURES * A. HISTORICAL APPLICATION TO CYBER DOMAIN * B. CURRENT STRUCTURE * 1. Benefits of Current Structure * 2. Drawbacks of Current Structure * C. MODIFIED JOINT STRUCTURE * 1. Benefits of a Modified Joint Structure * 2. Drawbacks of a Modified Joint Structure * 3. Application to the Cyber Domain * D. STAND-ALONE FORCE * 1. Benefits of a Stand-Alone Force * 2. Drawbacks of a Stand-Alone Force * E. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES * 1. Comparison of Modified Joint Structure to Current Structure * 2. Comparison of Stand-Alone Force Structure to Current Structure * F. SUMMARY * CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK * A. CONCLUSION * B. FUTURE WORK * LIST OF REFERENCES
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This anthology of cyber analogies will resonate with readers whose duties call for them to set strategies to protect the virtual domain and determine the policies that govern it. Our belief it that learning is most effective when concepts under consideration can be aligned with already-existing understanding or knowledge. Cyber issues are inherently tough to explain in layman's terms. The future is always open and undetermined, and the numbers of actors and the complexity of their relations are too great to give definitive guidance about future developments. In this report, historical analogies, carefully developed and properly applied, help indicate a direction for action by reducing complexity and making the future at least cognately manageable.
The Cyber Analogies Project was launched in 2012 to assist U.S. Cyber Command in identifying and developing relevant historical, economic, and other useful metaphors that could be used to enrich the discourse about cyber strategy, doctrine, and policy. The intent of the project is to provide useful insights, both for those with little technical background in or direct connection to cyberwar and cyber security and for those whose job it is to think about the spectrum of cyber-related issues every day. The project was conceived and carried out to help very senior, busy, responsible people understand topics and issues that are fast-moving and dynamic, and have potentially great consequences for society, security, and world affairs.
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Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book discusses the realities of deterrence and retaliatory options to attacks in space and cyberspace.
Since the last years of the 20th Century, threats in space and cyberspace have become prominent, to the point where an attack can threaten state sovereignty and have regional, if not global consequences. These threats are emerging at the same time that the United States' reliance on its own space and cyber capabilities increases to maintain international diplomatic leadership and conventional military superiority. US national policy speaks to deterring and defending against such attacks, but a lack of international precedent and the legal limitations of war, specifically attribution, proportionality and discrimination, limit United States response options to an unprovoked attack in these domains. In order to establish an effective deterrence, the United States must move away from the Cold War model and fashion a global environment that fosters effective deterrent strategies. Building this new order requires the United States lead the international debate to define attacks in space and cyberspace and appropriate "self-defense" responses under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The United States must demonstrate the political will to take action unilaterally, if necessary, to set precedent, and erase the failures of past transgressions, including NATO's failure to respond to the Estonia cyber attacks in 2007. As deterrence is predicated on the ability to attribute in order to hold an adversary at risk, the United States must improve its ability to detect and attribute attacks in space and cyberspace. Finally, the United States must reduce its space and cyberspace vulnerabilities and prove to any potential adversary that its military can successfully fight through any degradation and win. Unless the United States takes prominent actions on these fronts and establishes an international recognized lexicon on space and cyberspace, any deterrent posture will likely fail and it will remain at risk to asymmetric attacks by adversaries emboldened by a veil of anonymity, who see the benefits of attacking the United States outweighing the risk of an unprovoked first strike.