Reports of cyber criminals, “hacktivists” and nation-states accessing sensitive information and disrupting services in both the public and private domains have risen steadily, heightening concerns over the adequacy of cybersecurity measures. Cybersecurity related concerns range from spearfishing attempts and spam, to malware, to illegal or illicit activity on the dark net. More and more cases of successful cyber-attacks are being reported. Financial information, medical records, any and all personal data maintained on computer systems by individuals or by organizations large and small are vulnerable. Mobile, wireless technology presents new opportunities for cyber-attacks. As more devices communicate with one another, from security systems to thermostats, the “Internet of Things” presents a growing target. Social media sites and advertisements also present opportunities for cybersecurity breaches.
In today’s fast-paced world of overseas contingency and domestic operations, commanders rely on the advice of JAG Corps personnel to make critical decisions, sometimes involving life and death. Demand for this advice is high and will likely increase. The complexity of the operational environment is also growing. We can be sure that technological advances on the 21st Century battlefield will take us into uncharted legal territory, where we will be expected to analyze the complexities and provide accurate advice faster than ever before. Our ability to do so will have a direct impact on America’s capacity to effectively project power across the spectrum of conflict. Commanders count on legal teams knowledgeable in subjects ranging from weapon selection and target engagement to nation building and counterinsurgency activities. That’s why the second edition of the Air Force Operations & the Law: a Guide for Air & Space Forces is so important.
Brazil is a peaceful country, by tradition and conviction. It lives in peace with its neighbors. It runs its international affairs, among other things, adopting the constitutional principles of non-intervention, defense of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts. This pacifist trait is part of the national identity, and a value that should be preserved by the Brazilian people.
Brazil – a developing country – shall rise to the first stage in the world neither promoting hegemony nor domination. The Brazilian people are not willing to exert their power on other nations. They want Brazil to grow without reigning upon others.
This is perhaps the reason why Brazil has never conducted a wide discussion about its own defense affairs throughout its history. Periodically, governments used to authorize the acquisition or production of new defense products, and introduced specific reforms in the Armed Forces. However, a national strategy of defense has never been proposed to systematically guide the reorganization and reorientation of the Armed Forces; the organization of the defense industry in order to ensure the operational autonomy of the three service branches: the Navy, the Army and the Air Force; and the policies for the composition of their troops, moreover reconsidering the Mandatory Military Service.
However, if Brazil is willing to reach its deserved spot in the world, it will have to be prepared to defend itself not only from aggressions, but equally from threats.
Intimidation overrides good faith in the world where we live. Nothing substitutes the engagement of the Brazilian people in the debate and construction of their own defense.
The 6th National Strategy of Defense guideline:
“To strengthen three strategically important sectors: cybernetics, space and nuclear. This process of strengthening will ensure the fulfillment of the concept of flexibility. As a result of their own nature, these sectors transcend the border line between development and defense, between the civilian and the military. Both space and cybernetics sectors will, together, enable that the capacity to see one’s own country do not depend on foreign technology, and that the Armed Forces, together, can network supported by a monitoring system also space-based. Brazil is committed – as per the Federal Constitution and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – to the strictly peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, Brazil also asserts its strategic need to develop and master nuclear technology. The country needs to ensure the balance and the versatility of its energy matrix and advance in areas such as agriculture and health, which may benefit from nuclear energy technology. And carry out, among other initiatives that require technological independence in terms of nuclear energy, the nuclear-propelled submarine project.”
Download Estratégia Nacional de Defesa – Paz e segurança para o Brasil
Download National Strategy of Defense – Peace and security for Brazil
Download Estrategia Nacional de Defensa – Paz y seguridad para Brasil
Download Stratégie Nationale de Défense – Paix et Sécurité au Brésil
The United States, our allies, and our partners face a spectrum of challenges, including violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers, emerging space and cyber threats, natural and pandemic disasters, and a growing competition for resources. The Department of Defense must respond to these challenges while anticipating and preparing for those of tomorrow. We must balance strategic risk across our responses, making the best use of the tools at hand within the U.S. Government and among our international partners. To succeed, we must harness and integrate all aspects of national power and work closely with a wide range of allies, friends and partners. We cannot prevail if we act alone.
As noted in the 2006 QDR, state actors no longer have a monopoly over the catastrophic use of violence. Small groups or individuals can harness chemical, biological, or even crude radiological or nuclear devices to cause extensive damage and harm. Similarly, they can attack vulnerable points in cyberspace and disrupt commerce and daily life in the United States, causing economic damage, compromising sensitive information and materials, and interrupting critical services such as power and information networks. National security and domestic resources may be at risk, and the Department must help respond to protect lives and national assets. The Department will continue to be both bulwark and active protector in these areas. Yet, in the long run the Department of Defense is neither the best source of resources and capabilities nor the appropriate authority to shoulder these tasks. The comparative advantage, and applicable authorities, for action reside elsewhere in the U.S. Government, at other levels of government, in the private sector, and with partner nations. DoD should expect and plan to play a key supporting role in an interagency effort to combat these threats, and to help develop new capacities and capabilities, while protecting its own vulnerabilities.
In the contemporary strategic environment, the challenge is one of deterring or dissuading a range of potential adversaries from taking a variety of actions against the U.S. and our allies and interests. These adversaries could be states or non-state actors; they could use nuclear, conventional, or unconventional weapons; and they could exploit terrorism, electronic, cyber and other forms of warfare. Economic interdependence and the growth of global communications further complicate the situation. Not only do they blur the types of threats, they also exacerbate sensitivity to the effects of attacks and in some cases make it more difficult to attribute or trace them. Finally, the number of potential adversaries, the breadth of their capabilities, and the need to design approaches to deterrence for each, create new challenges.
An underlying assumption in our understanding of the strategic environment is that the predominant near-term challenges to the United States will come from state and non-state actors using irregular and catastrophic capabilities. Although our advanced space and cyber-space assets give us unparalleled advantages on the traditional battlefield, they also entail vulnerabilities.
China is developing technologies to disrupt our traditional advantages. Examples include development of anti-satellite capabilities and cyber warfare. Other actors, particularly non-state actors, are developing asymmetric tactics, techniques, and procedures that seek to avoid situations where our advantages come into play.
This book argues that Network Centric Warfare (NCW) influences how developed militaries operate in the same fashion that an operating system influences the development of computer software.
It examines three inter-related issues: the overwhelming military power of the United States; the growing influence of NCW on military thinking; and the centrality of coalition operations in modern military endeavours. Irrespective of terrorist threats and local insurgencies, the present international structure is remarkably stable – none of the major powers seeks to alter the system from its present liberal character, as demonstrated by the lack of a military response to US military primacy. This primacy privileges the American military doctrine and thus the importance of NCW, which promises a future of rapid, precise, and highly efficient operations, but also a future predicated on the ‘digitization’ of the battle space. Participation in future American-led military endeavours will require coalition partners to be networked: ‘interoperability’ will therefore be a key consideration of a partner’s strategic worth.
Network Centric Warfare and Coalition Operations will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, international security, US foreign policy and international relations in general.