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This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This research paper develops the foundation for a new military operating concept to "fight the net" in support of 8th Air Force requirements and stand-up as the new Cyber Command. It applies the Air Force Concept Development framework to examine cyberspace as a newly designated warfare domain, and proposes cyber capabilities and effects that the Air Force should develop and apply as it seeks to execute its mission in cyberspace. Before the Air Force can effectively lead in the cyber domain, it must first fully characterize cyber conditions, threats, and vulnerabilities, and clearly define how and where it can contribute to the national cyberspace strategy. Once the Air Force accomplishes these tasks, it can then focus on the nature of war in the cyber domain and consider the implications for military doctrine and operations. In order to successfully build capability and capacity for operating in cyberspace, the Air Force needs to institutionalize "cyber-mindedness" to underpin organizational, research and development, and human capital investments that the Air Force needs "to fly and fight" effectively in cyberspace.
THE CYBER DILEMMA * Bounding the Cyberspace Domain * Requirement for a New Framework * Physical Attributes * Domain Differentiation: Cyber versus Information Operations in Cyberspace * Broad Implications for Joint Military Operating Concepts * Effects in Cyberspace * Implications for Command and Control, Network Operations, and ISR * A New Military Problem and New Solutions * Missions that Assure Operations in Cyberspace * Time Horizon, Assumptions, and Risks * Relevance and Concluding Thoughts * THE U.S. CYBER SITUATION – THE PERFECT STORM? * Current Conditions in the Cyber Domain * Information Infrastructure and Critical Infrastructure * Existing "Weather Fronts" – Cyber Threat Agents * Threat and Threat Agent Defined * Threat Agent Profiles * Strong Tropical Disturbance Feeding Energy to the Weather Fronts a.k.a. Cyber Vulnerabilities * Battling the Simultaneously Challenging Winds of Change * U.S. National Strategic Way Ahead * National Strategy * Government Report Card * The Air Force and the Cyber Domain * THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN OF WAR * Conduct of War in Cyberspace * The Classics * The American Way of War * Military Operational Design * The Role of Technology * Principles and Functions of War * OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE * Intrinsic Characteristics as a Unique Combat Domain * Broader Span of Effects * Surgical Precision * Stealthy/Low Probability of Detection * Non-attribution/Untraceable * Cyber Capabilities * Cyber ISR * Target System Identification and Profiling * Access and Installation of a Persistent Presence * Mapping of Enemy Systems and Data * Analyzing Adversary Capabilities * Determining Adversary Intentions * Attack/Retaliatory Strike Planning * Cyber Defense * Protection from Attack * Attack Detection and Attribution * Automated Attack Responses and Operator Alerts * Self-healing of Systems and Networks * Rapid Recovery after Attack * Cyber Attack * Cyber Attack Authorization * Disruption of Adversary C2 Systems, Processes, and Data * Denying Access to Adversary Systems and Data * Degrading Adversary System Performance * Destruction of Adversary Data, Computers, Networks * Cyberspace Effects * Cyber ISR * Cyber Defense * Cyber Attack * RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE WAY AHEAD * Methodology * Cyberspace and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate * Revolution in Military Affairs Defined * So What? * Cyberspace Operations as a Mission Capability Package * Critical Factors * Constituting a Cyber Warfare Corps * Training for Cyber Combat * Organizing Cyber Forces * Cyber Weapon Funding * CONCLUDING THOUGHTS * BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. presented the 2015 annual U.S. intelligence community worldwide threat assessment in Congressional testimony on February 26, 2015. In the published report, Clapper provides a thorough review of the status of possible threats from a wide variety of nations and terror groups. In addition to the 2015 assessment, this compilation includes the 2014, 2013, and 2012 assessments for comparison and historical reference, plus important additional material, including the 2015 Defense Intelligence Agency worldwide threat assessment, the Obama White House National Security Strategy issued in early February 2015, remarks by National Security Advisor Susan Rice on the NSS, and dozens of statements on national security and the intelligence community from expert witnesses and officials.
Obviously, the Islamic State (ISIS, or ISIL) is a major focus of these assessments, along with cyber threats from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Other topics covered: Cyber * Counterintelligence * Terrorism * Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation * Space and Counterspace * Transnational Organized Crime * Economics and Natural Resources * Human Security * REGIONAL THREATS * Middle East and North Africa * Iraq * Syria * Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant * Iran * Libya * Yemen * Lebanon * Egypt * Tunisia * Europe * Turkey * Key Partners * Russia and Eurasia * Russia * Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus * The Caucasus and Central Asia * East Asia * China * North Korea * South Asia * Afghanistan * Pakistan * India * Sub-Saharan Africa * West Africa * Sudan * South Sudan * Nigeria * Somalia * Lord's Resistance Army * Central African Republic * The Sahel * Latin America and the Caribbean * Cuba * Central America * Venezuela * Haiti
Continue reading “2015 U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment – Clapper Testimony: Islamic State, ISIS, Cyber Threats, Russia, Iran, Terrorism, al-Qaida, North Korea, Syria, National Security Strategy”
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In 2005, the Department of Defense recognized cyberspace as the fifth operational domain. In 2009, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command directed the creation of U.S. Cyber Command on the heels of recently reported cyber attacks against Estonia and Georgia. These cyber attacks negatively affected the state's ability to provide effective governance. Sovereign nations across the world took notice. Cyber terrorism, at best cyber hacktivism, had crossed the threshold to embody what most consider acts of war. This strategic research paper utilizes the Estonia and Georgia cyber attacks to observe how cyber forces draw on the joint functions like a Brigade Combat Team or Air Expeditionary Wing uses the functions in their respective domains. The paper briefly describes cyber criminal activity, cyber hacktivism, and cyber terrorism to differentiate those activities from offensive cyber operations. The paper succinctly discusses U.S. Cyber Command's three mission areas, further defining the discipline of military offensive cyber operations. The paper then explores how Joint Force Commanders may utilize the joint warfighting functions depicted in Joint and Army doctrine to integrate and synchronize offensive cyber operations.
The cyber attacks on Estonia and Georgia negatively affected their ability to provide effective governance. Nations across the world took notice. Cyber terrorism, or at best cyber hacktivism, had crossed the threshold to embody what most sovereign nations consider acts of war. The Estonia and Georgia cyber attacks were not happenstance events, rather planned, integrated, and synchronized operations to achieve intended effects. The joint functions / warfighting functions provide an operational framework for Joint Force Commanders (JFC) to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize cyber operations. The ensuing analysis illustrates that cyber operations share many of the same qualities as the more traditional operations in the land, sea, air, and space domains. But, before any analysis can begin, we must review a few key actions the military has taken over the last ten years, define what constitutes cyberspace, and understand how cyber operations differs from cyber crimes, cyber hacktivism, and cyber terrorism.
Continue reading “Cyber Operations and the Warfighting Functions – USCYBERCOM, Cyber Attacks and Cyber War, Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS), SCADA, Russian and Georgian Conflict, Hacktivism”
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Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book discusses the realities of deterrence and retaliatory options to attacks in space and cyberspace.
Since the last years of the 20th Century, threats in space and cyberspace have become prominent, to the point where an attack can threaten state sovereignty and have regional, if not global consequences. These threats are emerging at the same time that the United States' reliance on its own space and cyber capabilities increases to maintain international diplomatic leadership and conventional military superiority. US national policy speaks to deterring and defending against such attacks, but a lack of international precedent and the legal limitations of war, specifically attribution, proportionality and discrimination, limit United States response options to an unprovoked attack in these domains. In order to establish an effective deterrence, the United States must move away from the Cold War model and fashion a global environment that fosters effective deterrent strategies. Building this new order requires the United States lead the international debate to define attacks in space and cyberspace and appropriate "self-defense" responses under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The United States must demonstrate the political will to take action unilaterally, if necessary, to set precedent, and erase the failures of past transgressions, including NATO's failure to respond to the Estonia cyber attacks in 2007. As deterrence is predicated on the ability to attribute in order to hold an adversary at risk, the United States must improve its ability to detect and attribute attacks in space and cyberspace. Finally, the United States must reduce its space and cyberspace vulnerabilities and prove to any potential adversary that its military can successfully fight through any degradation and win. Unless the United States takes prominent actions on these fronts and establishes an international recognized lexicon on space and cyberspace, any deterrent posture will likely fail and it will remain at risk to asymmetric attacks by adversaries emboldened by a veil of anonymity, who see the benefits of attacking the United States outweighing the risk of an unprovoked first strike.
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This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This paper is about the Russian military's use of operational art to achieve its strategic objectives during the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008. In this brief war, the Russian military in a quick and decisive campaign overwhelmed Georgian forces to gain control of two breakaway republics, destroyed much of Georgia's armed forces on land and sea, and caused NATO to reconsider its offer of membership to Georgia. This study focuses on the Russian military's present conception of operational art, the relationship between operational art and strategy, and the ability of the Russian armed forces to apply it in a war, a matter of strategic importance to Russia. To accomplish this, this study examines the roots of Soviet thought and practice on operational art and points out the significant changes over time which have affected current thought and practice. The paper analyzes significant aspects of the campaign in Georgia that reflect not only Russia's rich tradition of operational art, but also reflect Western thinking and new Russian thinking. The study examines the future of Russian operational art based on recently announced military reforms and the implications of those reforms on Russian strategy.
For over a century, Russian and Soviet military thinkers have developed the operational art and have produced quality works on the subject. They have prepared for and practiced operational art in a series of wars under widely varying conditions over the last 80 years. These wars are rich in lessons of success and failure in operational art.1 The campaigns and major operations within these wars reveal both the Russian military's conception of operational art as well as their capacity to craft it to achieve strategic objectives at that time. The Russo-Georgian War of August 2008 is no exception. It reflects the current state of operational art within the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the reforms announced immediately following the war by the president and other senior leaders reflect the nation's and military's intentions to improve their capacity to effectively wage campaigns in the near future and present additional insights into some of Russia's strategic objectives.