This latest revision of the Information Operations Primer provides an overview of Department of Defense (DoD) Information Operations (IO) doctrine and organizations at the joint and individual service levels. It is primarily intended to serve students and staff of the U.S. Army War College as a ready reference for IO information extracted and summarized from a variety of sources. Wherever possible, Internet websites have been given to provide access to additional and more up-to-date information. This booklet is intentionally UNCLASSIFIED so that the material can be easily referenced during course work, while engaged in exercises, and later in subsequent assignments. This booklet begins with an overview of Information Operations, Strategic Communication and Cyberspace Operations. At each level it describes strategies or doctrine, agencies, organizations, and educational institutions dedicated to the information element of national power. Finally, the document concludes with an IO specific glossary and hyperlinks to information operations, cyberspace operations and strategic communication related websites. CHAPTER I – CONCEPTS * Information Operations * Strategic Communication * Cyberspace and Cyberspace Operations * CHAPTER II – STRATEGIES, GUIDANCE & DOCTRINE * National Strategy and Guidance * U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace * National Framework for Strategic Communication * Department of Defense Strategy and Guidance * DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace * DoD Report on Strategic Communication * DoD Principles of Strategic Communication * Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3600.01 Information Operations * Joint Doctrine * Joint Information Operations Doctrine * Service Doctrine * Army Information Doctrine * Marine Corps Information Operations Doctrine * Navy Information Operations Doctrine * Air Force Information Operations Doctrine * CHAPTER III – ORGANIZATIONS * Department of State * Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs * The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications * National Agencies * National Security Agency (NSA) * Department of Defense * Under Secretary of Defense – Policy (USD(P)) * Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs – Communication Planning and Integration (CPI) * Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) * Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) * Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) * Joint Organizations and Educational Institutions * Joint Staff, Deputy Director for Global Operations (DDGO J39) * Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) * Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) * Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) * U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) * U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) * U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) * Joint Forces Staff College – Information Operations Program * Information Operations Center for Excellence Naval Postgraduate School * Service Organizations * Army Cyber Command/2nd Army * Army – 1st Information Operations Command (1st IO Cmd) * Army Reserve Information Operations Command (ARIOC) * United States Army Information Proponent Office (USAIPO) * Marine Corps Information Operations Center * Navy Information Operations Organizations * Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency * Headquarters 24th Air Force * 624th Operations Center * 67th Network Warfare Wing * 688th Information Operations Wing * 689th Combat Communications Wing * Glossary * Information Operations, Cyberspace, and Strategic Communication Related Websites
Public government statements have cited cyber-attacks by terrorists as a major concern for national security. To date, no large-scale cyber-terrorist attack has been observed, but terrorists are known to be using the Internet for various routine purposes. The discovery of Stuxnet in 2010 was a milestone in the arena of cybersecurity because, although a malware attack on industrial control systems was long believed to be theoretically possible, it was different to see malware used in reality to cause real physical damage. Stuxnet demonstrated that a sufficiently determined adversary with sufficient resources might be able to damage U.S. critical infrastructure physically through a cyber attack. Did Stuxnet change the threat of cyber-terrorism?
This monograph examines cyberterrorism before and after Stuxnet by addressing three questions: 1) Motive—Are terrorists interested in launching cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructures? 2) Means —Are terrorists building capabilities and skills for cyberattacks? and, 3) Opportunity—How vulnerable are U.S. critical infrastructures? Answers to these questions give a characterization of the post-Stuxnet cyberterrorism threat. The next question is why a major cyber-terrorist attack has not happened yet; this is explained from a cost-benefit perspective. Although cyberterrorism may not be an imminent threat, there are reasons to be concerned about the long-term threat and inevitability of cyberattacks. It is important to assess frequently the threat landscape and current government policies for enhancing the protection of national infrastructures.
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This research paper analyzes the globalization trend and the effect it is having on the ability to conduct asymmetrical attacks against the United States and our Allies worldwide. This research is intended to provide insight into the way that globalization is allowing our potential adversaries to act on a global scale.
Globalization is having a tremendous effect on the ability of terrorist and criminal organizations to act on a global scale. These organizations are using asymmetrical means to target U.S. interests at home and abroad. The events of September 11th were the culminating effect of this trend that has played an increasingly greater role in the world in which we live. This research paper analyzes the globalization trend and the effect it is having on the ability to wage this new type of war. The negative effects of globalization have continued to create a large disenfranchised population primarily centered in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. This disenfranchised population has become the recruitment pool and their countries have become training bases for the networked terrorist and criminal who take advantage of the tools of globalization. Those tools include the internet that provides secure means of communication, the technology that enables them to act, and the porous environment that allows one to move around the world undetected. The U.S. needs to develop a better National Security Structure to deal with this threat and solve longstanding foreign policy issues. This security structure would take advantage of a network architecture that would be much more suited to managing information which is the primary weapon in the globally connected world. Policy changes would address issues that only fuel resentment and hatred towards the U.S. and make it easier for our adversaries to plan and conduct asymmetrical attacks.
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This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. As the United States Air Force develops doctrine, education, and organization for cyberspace, we need to consider the traditional principles of war and how/if they apply to cyberspace, and under what situations, so we can develop a conceptual foundation for effective cyberspace warfighting doctrine. Most importantly, we should understand the cyberspace domain requires a new and different way of thinking to develop the most useful doctrine, education, and organizational structures. We must avoid falling into the trap of merely rewording existing air and space doctrine by simply replacing "air" or "space" with "cyber."
There are generally two predominant traditions for principles of war—the western view of Clausewitz and the eastern view of Sun Tzu. Clausewitz's western Newtonian world conceptualizes war using mass, objective, and maneuver among other principles in a state-on-state kinetic war for a political objective. However, Sun Tzu's eastern world conceptualizes war focusing on the criticality of intelligence, deception to defeat the mind of the enemy, and knowing that relationships between things matter most in the strategy of war. It is essential to examine which tradition is the best guide for developing cyber strategy; or do we need a combination?
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Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book discusses the realities of deterrence and retaliatory options to attacks in space and cyberspace.
Since the last years of the 20th Century, threats in space and cyberspace have become prominent, to the point where an attack can threaten state sovereignty and have regional, if not global consequences. These threats are emerging at the same time that the United States' reliance on its own space and cyber capabilities increases to maintain international diplomatic leadership and conventional military superiority. US national policy speaks to deterring and defending against such attacks, but a lack of international precedent and the legal limitations of war, specifically attribution, proportionality and discrimination, limit United States response options to an unprovoked attack in these domains. In order to establish an effective deterrence, the United States must move away from the Cold War model and fashion a global environment that fosters effective deterrent strategies. Building this new order requires the United States lead the international debate to define attacks in space and cyberspace and appropriate "self-defense" responses under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The United States must demonstrate the political will to take action unilaterally, if necessary, to set precedent, and erase the failures of past transgressions, including NATO's failure to respond to the Estonia cyber attacks in 2007. As deterrence is predicated on the ability to attribute in order to hold an adversary at risk, the United States must improve its ability to detect and attribute attacks in space and cyberspace. Finally, the United States must reduce its space and cyberspace vulnerabilities and prove to any potential adversary that its military can successfully fight through any degradation and win. Unless the United States takes prominent actions on these fronts and establishes an international recognized lexicon on space and cyberspace, any deterrent posture will likely fail and it will remain at risk to asymmetric attacks by adversaries emboldened by a veil of anonymity, who see the benefits of attacking the United States outweighing the risk of an unprovoked first strike.