The Weaponry and Strategies of Digital Conflict and Cyber War, Version 3, covering Cyber Warfare, Cyber Terrorism, Cyber Tradecraft, Cyber Activism and offensive, defensive actions and intelligence collection.
Cyber warfare, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage and cyber crime are all growing threats. The 2012 Version 3 of the Cyber Commander's eHandbook provides the insight needed to understand the new world of cyber warfare, as well as defines the tools and techniques for offensive and defensive cyber action, and provide cyber intelligence needed to understand the strategies behind building a dynamic and relevant cyber warfare capability.
Are our networked societies really vulnerable, as some have suggested, to a knock-out blow, perpetrated by state-sponsored hackers or terrorists? And what can be done to defend the state from this and from the encroachment of external networks that transcend its borders and breach its laws?
This Adelphi tackles the range of issues raised by our dependence on digital networks. It considers how instantaneous, global communications are challenging national and social orders and what shape those challenges may take as the net is cast ever wider. Comparing the transformations of the Information Age with those of previous generations, when new technologies and emerging transnational threats spread panic in political and strategic circles, the authors examine the real implications for states and statehood. Read more
‘In the cyber domain, policy has fallen far behind technology and operational art. By providing a conceptual framework for looking at what power is in the cyber domain and how it is exercised, this book offers policy-makers valuable guidance in how to think about a major security issue.’ Michael Hayden, Director of the CIA, 2006–09
‘Cyberspace offers a wealth of threats, benefits and opportunities for governments, business and the citizen. This book provides a stimulating contribution to the policy debate around cyber.’ Iain Lobban CB, Director, GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters)
With the end of the Cold War, U.S. national security perceptions concerning “Who is the threat?” have been thrown into free fall along with those governmental and military institutions meant to contend with it. Resulting from the spreading chaos and ambiguity in the nation-state system, which stem from the simultaneous processes of fragmentation and regionalization, a new question now needs to be asked—“What is the threat?” Increasingly, national security experts have argued that gray area phenomena,“. . . where control has shifted from legitimate governments to new half political, half-criminal powers,” will become the dominant threat.1 Such entities flourish in the growing failed-state operational environment where a condition of “not war–not crime” prevails and nation-state forces operating within it find themselves facing a severe capability gap.2 These entities disregard Western based “laws of war” and “rules of engagement” and are not concerned about such conventions as “legitimacy” or “public opinion.” Of further significance is the recognition that we are beginning the transition from the modern to the postmodern epoch in Western civilization. Past periods of transition such as this have historically witnessed the two collinear trends of the blurring of crime and war, along with shifts in social classes, economic modes, and motive sources which ultimately result in the fall of one civilization and its replacement by another more advanced one. 3 During the earlier shift from the medieval to the modern epoch, three new forms of social and political organization developed dynastic- (proto nation-) states, city-states, and city-leagues—as competitors to the then dominant feudal structure,4 in tandem with the domination of the battlefield by the non state soldier. Ultimately the early nation-state form and its mercenary armies won out over both these competitors and the preexisting civilization based upon Church, empire, and fief. As the shift to the post-modern epoch becomes more pronounced, we can expect similar competitors to the nation-state form and our modern civilization to emerge along with the accompanying non-state soldier. One such projected warmaking entity, “Black,” and its advanced means of waging war will be discussed in this paper. It is based upon an organizational structure far different than the classical hierarchy to which we are accustomed. Rather, it is nonlinear in function, composed of informational paths analogous to webs and nets, and basic units characterized as nodes and free floating cells.5 Such an organizational structure allows for the greater exploitation of postmechanical energy sources, advanced technologies, and new warfighting concepts which will come to dominate what we will term “war” in the decades to come.
Increasingly, the power of a large, complex, wired nation like the United States rests on its ability to disrupt would-be cyber attacks and to be resilient against a successful attack or recurring campaign. Addressing the concerns of both theorists and those on the national security front lines, Chris C. Demchak presents a unified strategy for survival in an interconnected, ever-messier, more surprising cybered world and examines the institutional adaptations required of our defense, intelligence, energy, and other critical sectors for national security.
Demchak introduces a strategy of “security resilience” against surprise attacks for a cybered world that is divided between modern, digitally vulnerable city-states and more dysfunctional global regions. Its key concepts build on theories of international relations, complexity in social-technical systems, and organizational-institutional adaptation. Demchak tests the strategy for reasonableness in history’s few examples of states disrupting rather than conquering and being resilient to attacks, including ancient Athens and Sparta, several British colonial wars, and two American limited wars. She applies the strategy to modern political, social, and technical challenges and presents three kinds of institutional adaptation that predicate the success of the security resilience strategy in response. Finally, Demchak discusses implications for the future including new forms of cyber aggression like the Stuxnet worm, the rise of the cyber-command concept, and the competition between the U.S. and China as global cyber leaders.
Wars of Disruption and Resilience offers a blueprint for a national cyber-power strategy that is long in time horizon, flexible in target and scale, and practical enough to maintain the security of a digitized nation facing violent cybered conflict.
In military operations, information has always been every bit as vital as fuel or ammunition in achieving favorable outcomes. Today, the need to reduce decision timelines highlights its importance. The Navy postulates that network-centric operations will enhance the effectiveness of combat systems by allowing commanders to mass effects from great distances. At issue is verification of this assumption. How can the effectiveness of network-centric information systems be linked to combat outcomes? The authors seek to identify how information affects outcomes and determine how to measure the link between the two. This report creates a framework for developing measures to help the Navy decide how network-centric operations affect combat outcomes and which information systems work best. The authors demonstrate a proof-of-concept tool that cangenerate several alternative network-centric command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissancesystems. Using a spreadsheet model, they take the first steps toward developing formulas to help the Navy codify an approach to measuring combat effectiveness in network-centric operations.