Chapters: Non-Disclosure Agreement, Research and Analysis Wing, Biometric Passport, Wikileaks, Classified Information, Passenger Name Record, Classified Information in the United Kingdom, Cyber Spying, Aviation Research Centre, Security Breach Notification Laws, Director of the National Clandestine Service, Titan Rain, Traffic Light Protocol, Extended Access Control, Z-Division, Operation Leech, Faa 1600.2, Rcis. Source: Wikipedia. Pages: 119. Not illustrated. Free updates online. Purchase includes a free trial membership in the publisher’s book club where you can select from more than a million books without charge. Excerpt: The Radio Research Center Electronics
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Citation Details Title: Cyber warfare operations: development and use under international law. Author: Arie J. Schaap Publication:Air Force Law Review (Magazine/Journal) Date: December 22, 2009 Publisher: U.S. Air Force Academy, Department of Law Issue: 64 Page: 121(53)
The electricity infrastructure is one of society’s most critical infrastructures. The complexity of the electricity infrastructure system is increasing quickly, due to the increasing intensity of market-based power exchanges between electricity systems, the associated market restructuring and an increasing share of decentralized generation. As a consequence, the organizational complexity of power systems has exploded. At the same time, there is a shift in public and societal goals towards low-carbon and sustainable power generation. This will eventually require a drastic transformation of the industry. Increasingly, ICT is being depended upon for managing this infrastructure, for technical control and operation and for facilitating markets. A recent example is demand-side management, based on detailed metering of consumption and decentralized electricity generation.
The mutual dependence of the electricity and the ICT infrastructures raises challenging questions in the areas of dependability, security and resilience. Examples include vulnerability to (cyber) attacks, avoiding and repairing technical failures and protecting data confidentiality, while guaranteeing accessibility. Therefore, better models and methods for protection against exploits of system vulnerabilities, whether accidental or intentional such as in cyber attacks, are called for.
To address the above mentioned problems an advanced research workshop: “Electricity security in the cyber age: Managing the increasing dependence of the electricity infrastructure on ICT” was organized in the Netherlands in May 2009. The objective of the workshop was to contribute to the security of current and future electricity infrastructures by analyzing the risks that are caused by the increasing reliance upon ICT and investigating options for managing these risks. The book presents the contributions to the workshop by distinguished invited keynote speakers and participants from the international scientific and industrial community.
Asymmetric warfare is war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly. “Asymmetric warfare” can describe a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the “weaker” combatants attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality. Such strategies may not necessarily be militarized. This is in contrast to symmetric warfare, where two powers have similar military power and resources and rely on tactics that are similar overall, differing only in details and execution.
The Information Age has dawned at the same time the global political system is in transition. High technology performance and economic productivity are converging across the major developed regions of North America, East Asia, and Europe. If U.S. economic, military, and political leadership is to continue, it must depend more on flexible adaptation to the new technical and organizational realities and less on technological dominance. The heart of this adaptation lies in the evolution of a national technology policy that emphasizes market forces and the exploitation of network linkages within and among commercial and military organizations.