This book interrogates the philosophical backdrop of Clausewitzian notions of war, and asks whether modern, network-centric militaries can still be said to serve the ‘political'.
In light of the emerging theories and doctrines of Network-Centric War (NCW), this book traces the philosophical backdrop against which the more common theorizations of war and its conduct take place. Tracing the historical and philosophical roots of modern war from the 17th Century through to the present day, this book reveals that far from paralyzing the project of re-problematisating war, the emergence of NCW affords us an opportunity to rethink war in new and philosophically challenging ways.
This book will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, social theory, war studies and political theory/IR.
This book argues that Network Centric Warfare (NCW) influences how developed militaries operate in the same fashion that an operating system influences the development of computer software.
It examines three inter-related issues: the overwhelming military power of the United States; the growing influence of NCW on military thinking; and the centrality of coalition operations in modern military endeavours. Irrespective of terrorist threats and local insurgencies, the present international structure is remarkably stable – none of the major powers seeks to alter the system from its present liberal character, as demonstrated by the lack of a military response to US military primacy. This primacy privileges the American military doctrine and thus the importance of NCW, which promises a future of rapid, precise, and highly efficient operations, but also a future predicated on the ‘digitization’ of the battle space. Participation in future American-led military endeavours will require coalition partners to be networked: ‘interoperability’ will therefore be a key consideration of a partner’s strategic worth.
Network Centric Warfare and Coalition Operations will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, international security, US foreign policy and international relations in general.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld arrived at the Pentagon in 2001 with an agenda that included the transformation of the American armed forces. His intent was to modernize the existing force while simultaneously developing high-tech innovations to revolutionize the military of the future. The primary architect of transformation, Arthur Cebrowski, conceived what is known as network-centric warfare—a concept to leverage advances in military technology that will influence the U.S. Armed Forces for many decades to come.
The basis of this work was Arthur Cebrowski's autobiographical history of the development of network-centric warfare. He passed away, however, before he could complete his account. Blaker has used much of the material gathered by Cebrowski to craft a history based on the former naval officer's own writings, testimony, and interviews of Cebrowski conducted by a variety of individuals in the media and military during his time in Washington, D.C. Transforming Military Force is also an examination of the successes and failures of this new form of warfare, analyzing what has been done in the past and offering suggestions on the future direction of this form of conflict.
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On November 23, 2013, China's Ministry of National Defense spokesman announced that a new air defense intercept zone (ADIZ) will be established by the government to include the Diaoyu, or Senkaku Islands. Sovereignty over these islands is disputed by Japan, China, and Taiwan. The new ADIZ also included a submerged rock that falls inside overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) claimed by China, Japan, and South Korea. Pundits and policy analysts quickly engaged in a broad debate about whether China's expanded ADIZ is designed to create tension in Asia, or is part of a broader plan to impose a new definition of China's territorial space in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, to deal with cyber penetrations attributed to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), the U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State are devising new means to protect intellectual property and secrets from the PLA's computer network operations.
Dr. Larry M. Wortzel's monograph puts these events into perspective. The ADIZ announcement by China, at one level, is an example of the PLA General Political Department engagement in what it calls "legal warfare," part of the PLA's "three warfares." In expanding its ADIZ, China is stretching International Civil Aviation Organization regulations to reinforce its territorial claims over the Senkaku Islands, administered by Japan. China calls these the Diaoyu Islands and, along with Taiwan, claims them for its own. On another level, the Chinese government will use the ADIZ as a way to increase the airspace it can monitor and control off its coast; it already is suing the navy and maritime law enforcement ships to enforce these claims at sea. Additionally, the PLA and the Chinese government have sent a major signal to Taiwan, demonstrating another aspect of the "three warfares." When the Chinese Ministry of National Defense put its expanded ADIZ into effect, the new zone carefully avoided any infringement into Taiwan's ADIZ, signaling that in addition to the improved economic ties with Taiwan, there is room for political improvement across the Taiwan Strait. Continue reading “Chinese People's Liberation Army and Information Warfare – PLA, Network-Centric Warfare, Electronic and Cyber Warfare, China Espionage, Implications for United States, Psychological Warfare”