As recent events demonstrate, the manifestations of Islamist extremism in Europe are manifold. They range from youngsters who reject both government and academic attempts at multiculturalism to radical imams who influence their congregations against their host countries to fundamentalist converts who believe the West is on a crusade to destroy Islam. Chat rooms on the Internet are used with powerful effect to proselytize, recruit, radicalize, fund raise, train, and plot acts of terrorism. In part to counter violent Islamist extremism, the U.S. National Intelligence Strategy seeks to: (1) develop innovative ways to penetrate and analyze the most difficult targets ; and (2) strengthen analytic expertise, methods, and practices; tap expertise wherever it resides; and explore alternative analytic views. Consequently, the director of national intelligence has given top priority to enhancing outreach to the myriad sources of expertise and open source information that can play a decisive role in countering threats such as terrorism. Over the past year, the CSIS Transnational Threats Project operated and tested a global Trusted Information Network (TIN) devoted to critical threat issues demonstrating that structured interaction with nongovernmental experts on the periphery can provide innovative, alternative analysis and perspectives. Islamist extremism in Europe was explored by the TIN s internationally recognized experts, even as daily events in Europe illustrated that al Qaeda inspired terrorists continue to proliferate among Muslim communities there. TIN members, in a collaborative online setting, contributed fresh information and perceptions about the extremists route to violence and their aspirations. This report reviews the workings of the CSIS network and demonstrates the contribution such a TIN can make as a force multiplier for intelligence in the information age.
Technology is an essential part of society in the Information Age. Warfare has always had a technological dimension. In the era of information and the interconnected world, the critical infrastructure of nations has become increasingly reliant upon computer networks: by using the methods of computer network attacks many critical functions of a State could be damaged. This has raised a discussion related to States' national and economic security concerning a new battlefield, warfare in cyberspace.
This report surveys one new facet of technology: computer network attacks, from the framework of the law of armed conflict by asking if the existing law of armed conflict, the main parts of which have their origins in the legacies of two World Wars, applies to computer network attacks. Moreover, the report addresses the questions of the perpetrators of the computer network attacks in the context of the law of armed conflict, what targets can be attacked with the means and methods of computer network attacks and how these attacks should be conducted under the laws of armed conflict.
The information infrastructure–comprising computers, embedded devices, networks and software systems–is vital to operations in every sector. Global business and industry, governments, and society itself, cannot function effectively if major components of the critical information infrastructure are degraded, disabled or destroyed.
This book contains a selection of 27 edited papers from the First Annual IFIP WG 11.10 International Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection.
Despite their popularity and wider deployment, IEEE 802.11 WLANs have been found to be vulnerable to security threats soon after their emergence requiring adoption of security measures. However, the introduced security measures didn't provide solutions for Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This book characterizes the DoS attacks based on their ease of applicability and the degree of severity they introduce, and evaluates countermeasures for efficiency and effectiveness in defending against the attacks. Among various DoS attacks, Authentication Request Flooding (AuthRF) and Association Request Flooding (AssRF), which are practical and needing lesser effort to cause damage, were selected for study using OMNET++ simulation environment embedding INET Framework. Designs and models have been developed for the selected attacks and for two versions of defenses: countermeasure and enhanced countermeasures. The studied attacks, AuthRF and AssRF, required less effort and caused severe damage. Both versions of defenses, Countermeasure and Enhanced countermeasure, are effective although they incur delay.