China‘s INEW doctrine combining network attack with electronic warfare supports the use of cyber warfare in future conflict. The IW militia unit organization provides each Chinese military region commander with unique network attack, exploitation, and defense capabilities. IW unit training focuses on improving network attack skills during military exercises. The integration of the IW militia units with commercial technology companies provides infrastructure and technical support enabling the units to conduct operations. The IW units gather intelligence on an adversary‘s networks identifying critical nodes and security weaknesses. Armed with this intelligence, these units are capable of conducting network attack to disrupt or destroy the identified critical nodes of an enemy‘s C4ISR assets allowing China to use military force in a local war. In an effort to regain its former status, China pursues the strategic goal of reunification of its claimed sovereign territories and lands using economic influence as the primary means but will resort to military force if necessary. Recent cyber activities attributed to China suggest that network exploitation is currently underway and providing military, political, and economic information to the CCP. Domestically and internationally, China views Taiwan and the United States respectively as the major threats to the CCP.
Over the last several years, the Committee has listened with increasing alarm to the testimony of senior intelligence officials and private sector experts about the growing cybersecurity threats to our nation. The Committee has already seen the impact these threats are having on the nation's security and its economy as losses to consumers, businesses, and the government from cyber attacks, penetrations, and disruptions already total billions of dollars. Beyond direct monetary losses, the continuing efforts of foreign actors to steal intellectual property will have far reaching impacts on the innovation upon which a robust economy and strong military relies. The Committee has seen widespread theft through cyberspace increasingly evolve into disruptive and destructive attacks. Our nation is growing more vulnerable to cyber threats. Every aspect of society is growing more dependent on computers which are all linked to networks, opening this country up to many known vulnerabilities and many yet to be discovered.
Cyber weapons and the possibility of cyber conflict ― including interference in foreign political campaigns, industrial sabotage, attacks on infrastructure, and combined military campaigns ― require policymakers, scholars, and citizens to rethink twenty-first-century warfare. Yet because cyber capabilities are so new and continually developing, there is little agreement about how they will be deployed, how effective they can be, and how they can be managed.
Written by leading scholars, the fourteen case studies in this volume will help policymakers, scholars, and students make sense of contemporary cyber conflict through historical analogies to past military-technological problems. The chapters are divided into three groups. The first ― What Are Cyber Weapons Like? ― examines the characteristics of cyber capabilities and how their use for intelligence gathering, signaling, and precision striking compares with earlier technologies for such missions. The second section ― What Might Cyber Wars Be Like? ― explores how lessons from several wars since the early nineteenth century, including the World Wars, could apply ― or not ― to cyber conflict in the twenty-first century. The final section ― What Is Preventing and/or Managing Cyber Conflict Like? ― offers lessons from past cases of managing threatening actors and technologies.
This book is a multi-disciplinary analysis of cyber warfare, featuring contributions by leading experts from a mixture of academic and professional backgrounds.
Cyber warfare, meaning interstate cyber aggression, is an increasingly important emerging phenomenon in international relations, with state-orchestrated (or apparently state-orchestrated) computer network attacks occurring in Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008) and Iran (2010). This method of waging warfare – given its potential to, for example, make planes fall from the sky or cause nuclear power plants to melt down – has the capacity to be as devastating as any conventional means of conducting armed conflict. Every state in the world now has a cyber-defence programme and over 120 states also have a cyber-attack programme.
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Cyberattacks are one of the greatest fears for governments and the private sector. The attacks come without warning and can be extremely costly and embarrassing.
Robert Mandel offers a unique and comprehensive strategic vision for how governments, in partnership with the private sector, can deter cyberattacks from both nonstate and state actors. Cyberdeterrence must be different from conventional military or nuclear deterrence, which are mainly based on dissuading an attack by forcing the aggressor to face unacceptable costs. In the cyber realm, where attributing a specific attack to a specific actor is extremely difficult, conventional deterrence principles are not enough. Mandel argues that cyberdeterrence must alter a potential attacker’s decision calculus by not only raising costs for the attacker but also by limiting the prospects for gain. Cyberdeterrence must also involve indirect unorthodox restraints, such as exposure to negative blowback and deceptive diversionary measures, and cross-domain measures rather than just retaliation in kind.
Continue reading “Optimizing Cyberdeterrence: A Comprehensive Strategy for Preventing Foreign Cyberattacks”