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This latest revision of the Information Operations Primer provides an overview of Department of Defense (DoD) Information Operations (IO) doctrine and organizations at the joint and individual service levels. It is primarily intended to serve students and staff of the U.S. Army War College as a ready reference for IO information extracted and summarized from a variety of sources. Wherever possible, Internet websites have been given to provide access to additional and more up-to-date information. This booklet is intentionally UNCLASSIFIED so that the material can be easily referenced during course work, while engaged in exercises, and later in subsequent assignments.
This booklet begins with an overview of Information Operations, Strategic Communication and Cyberspace Operations. At each level it describes strategies or doctrine, agencies, organizations, and educational institutions dedicated to the information element of national power. Finally, the document concludes with an IO specific glossary and hyperlinks to information operations, cyberspace operations and strategic communication related websites.
CHAPTER I – CONCEPTS * Information Operations * Strategic Communication * Cyberspace and Cyberspace Operations * CHAPTER II – STRATEGIES, GUIDANCE & DOCTRINE * National Strategy and Guidance * U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace * National Framework for Strategic Communication * Department of Defense Strategy and Guidance * DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace * DoD Report on Strategic Communication * DoD Principles of Strategic Communication * Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3600.01 Information Operations * Joint Doctrine * Joint Information Operations Doctrine * Service Doctrine * Army Information Doctrine * Marine Corps Information Operations Doctrine * Navy Information Operations Doctrine * Air Force Information Operations Doctrine * CHAPTER III – ORGANIZATIONS * Department of State * Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs * The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications * National Agencies * National Security Agency (NSA) * Department of Defense * Under Secretary of Defense – Policy (USD(P)) * Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs – Communication Planning and Integration (CPI) * Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) * Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) * Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) * Joint Organizations and Educational Institutions * Joint Staff, Deputy Director for Global Operations (DDGO J39) * Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) * Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) * Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) * U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) * U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) * U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) * Joint Forces Staff College – Information Operations Program * Information Operations Center for Excellence Naval Postgraduate School * Service Organizations * Army Cyber Command/2nd Army * Army – 1st Information Operations Command (1st IO Cmd) * Army Reserve Information Operations Command (ARIOC) * United States Army Information Proponent Office (USAIPO) * Marine Corps Information Operations Center * Navy Information Operations Organizations * Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency * Headquarters 24th Air Force * 624th Operations Center * 67th Network Warfare Wing * 688th Information Operations Wing * 689th Combat Communications Wing * Glossary * Information Operations, Cyberspace, and Strategic Communication Related Websites
With Twitter revolutions, state-sponsored hacking and the Stuxnet virus driving rapid change in the cyber-age battlefield, this World Politics Review special report examines the state of cyber power through articles published in the past year.
A powerful, vivid history of Israel's intelligence services from the country's independence in 1948, right up to Stuxnet and the current Middle East crises, describing the roots of both the triumphs and the screw-ups. Chapter 1 is titled “Stopping Iran,” focused on nuclear threats, and then readers are taken through the entire history.
In September 2010, media reports emerged about a new form of cyber attack that appeared to target Iran, although the actual target, if any, is unknown. Through the use of thumb drives in computers that were not connected to the Internet, a malicious software program known as Stuxnet infected computer systems that were used to control the functioning of a nuclear power plant. Once inside the system, Stuxnet had the ability to degrade or destroy the software on which it operated. Although early reports focused on the impact on facilities in Iran, researchers discovered that the program had spread throughout multiple countries worldwide.
From the perspective of many national security and technology observers, the emergence of the Stuxnet worm is the type of risk that threatens to cause harm to many activities deemed critical to the basic functioning of modern society. The Stuxnet worm covertly attempts to identify and exploit equipment that controls a nation’s critical infrastructure. A successful attack by a software application such as the Stuxnet worm could result in manipulation of control system code to the point of inoperability or long-term damage. Should such an incident occur, recovery from the damage to the computer systems programmed to monitor and manage a facility and the physical equipment producing goods or services could be significantly delayed. Depending on the severity of the attack, the interconnected nature of the affected critical infrastructure facilities, and government preparation and response plans, entities and individuals relying on these facilities could be without life sustaining or comforting services for a long period of time. The resulting damage to the nation’s critical infrastructure could threaten many aspects of life, including the government’s ability to safeguard national security interests.
Iranian officials have claimed that Stuxnet caused only minor damage to its nuclear program, yet the potential impact of this type of malicious software could be far-reaching. The discovery of the Stuxnet worm has raised several issues for Congress, including the effect on national security, what the government’s response should be, whether an international treaty to curb the use of malicious software is necessary, and how such a treaty could be implemented. Congress may also consider the government’s role in protecting critical infrastructure and whether new authorities may be required for oversight.
Has the Stuxnet worm ushered in a new era of cyberwar, or is it simply the latest iteration of familiar strategic instruments? Has the Internet irrevocably shifted the balance between individuals and states, or will governments adapt to regain the upper hand? Does the real threat to cybersystems lie within cyberspace, or in the real world? Cyberwar has become a permanent feature of the strategic landscape, but we might hardly know it.